- The FAA found the VNAV defect does not pose a safety concern because pilots retain control and receive clear indications.
- The issue affects VNAV versions 14 and 14.1 after certain missed approaches; earlier versions are unaffected.
- Boeing is developing a permanent software correction, while the FAA plans guidance for airlines on managing the defect.
The FAA said October 2, 2026, that a software defect in certain Boeing 737 MAX flight computers does not pose a safety concern. The agency concluded that pilots keep control and receive clear cockpit indications. The issue affects aircraft running VNAV software versions 14 and 14.1; earlier versions are not affected.
The defect can arise after a missed approach or go-around if a crew changes the programmed flight path. Automated vertical navigation may then fail to return as expected on a later approach, leaving pilots to take additional steps and potentially manage the approach manually. No airline operator has reported an adverse incident linked to the problem.
FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford described the concern as added cockpit work, not a loss of authority over the aircraft. “The pilots remain in control of the airliner, train for these scenarios. The issue that we’re looking at right now is the workload component.”
The agency’s Corrective Action Review Board reached its conclusion after a technical review in Seattle. Its statement said a panel of safety experts determined the software issue did not pose a safety concern.
“The FAA’s Corrective Action Review Board made that determination because pilots retain full control of the aircraft and the indications to the flight crew are clear and unambiguous.”
Boeing found the defect and notified airlines and regulators in August 2026. The agency had announced on September 26, 2026, that it would examine whether the problem could create an unsafe workload for pilots.
The defect can interrupt automation after a missed approach
The software problem appears when pilots revise a preprogrammed route during a missed approach or reapproach. In that situation, the aircraft’s automated vertical-navigation function may not become available again in the way crews expect. Pilots must carry out further cockpit actions and may have to handle the next approach without that automation.
The review focused on how that interruption affects a crew during a demanding phase of flight. Bedford said the problem “doesn’t take control away from the pilots.” The board’s review included FAA specialists in airframes, flight controls, propulsion, flight testing and other technical fields.
The agency said it would issue a special bulletin with guidance for airlines on identifying and handling the defect. It also said it could take additional steps if new information changed its assessment.
Boeing is working on a permanent software update and coordinating with airlines on procedures to restore automated vertical navigation if the defect occurs. The planned correction is not yet a completed fix. The FAA’s earlier certification of the 737 MAX 7 in August 2026 included the affected software.
The finding removes a hurdle, not the MAX 10’s certification process
The FAA had paused certification work on the 737 MAX 10, the largest version of the aircraft family, while it assessed the defect. The October 2 finding removes this issue as an obstacle, and certification could come by the end of October 2026. The aircraft must still complete the broader certification process.
Sheila Kahyaoglu, the Jefferies analyst who follows Boeing, projected that certification could take place before the end of 2026, with first deliveries potentially following in 2027. She also anticipated that the agency would eventually require software updates.
The chief executives of Alaska Airlines and Ryanair, both customers that have MAX 10 orders, publicly played down concern over the certification delay. Their comments came as the FAA’s safety finding narrowed the immediate question to pilot workload and Boeing’s corrective work.
Airlines and a safety expert say crews can manage the interruption
John Cox, a pilot and longtime aviation-safety expert, called the agency’s decision “reasonable.” He compared automated flight controls with a car’s cruise control, saying crews could compensate if they knew automation might drop out during a missed approach.
“If the pilots know that there is a potential for the autopilot and autothrust to drop out during a missed approach, you can compensate for that.”
Cox added: “It’s not unsafe; it's just you need to be aware.”
Alaska Airlines also said it did not view the defect as a flight-safety concern. The carrier said existing procedures could mitigate the issue while Boeing and GE develop a permanent software update.
“Our understanding is that pilots remain in full control of the aircraft, existing procedures provide effective mitigations, and the issue can be safely managed while GE and Boeing develop a permanent software update.”
The current defect differs from the MAX’s earlier MCAS failures, which were involved in the Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashes. Bedford said the new issue does not take control from pilots. The immediate concern is additional workload if automation changes during a missed approach, not an aircraft becoming uncontrollable.
The agency’s review and Boeing’s software work now proceed on separate tracks. The FAA retains authority to require further action if operational information changes its assessment, while Boeing continues developing the permanent correction.
