(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO) — The Democratic Republic of the Congo confirmed a deal on April 5, 2026, to receive some migrants from the United States, extending a U.S. third-country program that now reaches central Africa as Washington pushes a wider network of transfer agreements.

The Congolese Ministry of Communications called the agreement a “temporary” arrangement and said each transfer would face an individual review rather than an automatic handover. It also said the United States would bear the cost.

“Congo will receive some migrants as part of a new deal under the U.S. third-country program. This stay is not intended to become a mechanism for permanent settlement on national territory. No automatic transfer is planned, and each case will be subject to an individual review in accordance with the laws of the Republic and national security requirements,” the ministry said.

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The ministry said the deal reflected Congo’s “commitment to human dignity and international solidarity” and would come with “zero costs” to the Congolese government, with the U.S. covering all logistics.

Washington has framed the policy as part of a faster removal system. In a March 17, 2026 statement on the broader strategy, a Department of Homeland Security and ICE spokesperson said, “We are working to get [unauthorized individuals] out of our country as quickly as possible while ensuring they receive all available legal process, including a hearing before an immigration judge. Under President Trump. we are partnering with our great allies across the globe to accept asylum seekers.”

The expansion to Congo comes as the United States builds what officials and analysts describe as a broader third-country program, using partner nations as transfer, processing or holding points outside migrants’ home countries. Congo joins at least seven other African nations with similar arrangements, including Ghana, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, and South Sudan.

U.S. officials have also given fresh guidance on how the system will operate. Markwayne Mullin was sworn in as Secretary of Homeland Security on March 24, 2026, succeeding Kristi Noem, and a DHS spokesperson said on April 6, 2026 that there is “no plan” to halt the use of planes for these transfers.

That clarification followed reports that some internal discussions had considered a pause on certain flight operations. DHS has kept the broader policy in place.

Financially, the system has already carried a high price. The United States has reportedly spent at least $40 million to deport approximately 300 migrants to third countries through the expanding network.

The Congo arrangement adds a new geographic node to that effort. Facilities near Kinshasa have already been prepared to house incoming deportees starting in April 2026.

Transfers to Congo may include migrants from South America, according to reports from UN sources cited in the summary, with Venezuelans named as one group that could be sent there. The policy spans multiple nationalities rather than one country or region.

The agreement also lands at the intersection of immigration enforcement and wider U.S. policy in the region. It coincides with the “Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity,” announced on March 18, 2026, a U.S.-mediated peace deal between Congo and Rwanda aimed at lowering tensions in eastern Congo.

That overlap has drawn attention because the Congo deal reaches beyond migration management alone. The partnership is linked to the Strategic Asset Reserve, or SAR, which ensures U.S. access to Congolese critical minerals such as cobalt and copper.

Under that broader framework, Congo has reportedly granted U.S. companies preferential investment access to high-value mining assets in exchange for accepting deportees. The immigration deal, in that account, forms part of a wider package joining security, economic and diplomatic goals.

Official U.S. references to the diplomatic side of the arrangement appeared through the U.S. Embassy in the DRC and the U.S. Department of State – Office of the Spokesperson. The enforcement side of the policy has been reflected through the DHS Newsroom and the USCIS Newsroom.

For Congo, the public message has emphasized sovereignty and control. The Congolese Ministry of Communications did not present the agreement as open-ended resettlement, and its statement stressed case-by-case review under Congolese law and national security requirements.

That language goes to one of the central concerns surrounding the temporary arrangement. Congo has insisted it will review each person individually, but critics question whether host-country systems can safely absorb detainees or deportees transferred from far outside the region.

Human rights advocates and legal experts, including those at Third Country Deportation Watch, have warned that the transfers may bypass court-ordered protections. Some people sent to third countries reportedly hold Convention Against Torture protections or other legal deferrals designed to block removal to dangerous conditions.

Those concerns focus not only on destination countries, but on the mechanics of transfer itself. If a migrant cannot be sent back to a home country because of legal protection, advocates say removal to a third country can test the limits of those safeguards.

The United States has answered that criticism by pointing to process. The March 17 DHS and ICE statement said people removed under the policy would receive “all available legal process, including a hearing before an immigration judge.”

Even so, the question of what happens after transfer remains central to the debate. Critics argue that migrants are being sent to countries with “notoriously repressive governments and poor human rights records.”

Congo’s government has tried to narrow that concern with procedural language rather than broad promises. Its statement said “each case will be subject to an individual review,” a formulation that places responsibility on domestic review mechanisms as the transfers begin.

Capacity is another issue. Facilities near Kinshasa have been prepared to receive deportees, but concern persists over whether local infrastructure can meet medical and humanitarian needs once arrivals begin in April 2026.

The expansion also illustrates the scale of a wider shift in U.S. enforcement. Rather than relying solely on deportation to a migrant’s country of origin, Washington is building a globalized removal network in which third-party states serve as secondary destinations.

That model can shorten the distance between detention and removal from U.S. soil, especially when direct return is delayed or blocked. It also redistributes the burden of custody and screening to countries that are not the migrants’ own.

In Congo, the government has tried to draw a line around that role. By calling the deal temporary, rejecting automatic transfers and stressing zero cost to the state, the Congolese Ministry of Communications presented the arrangement as limited, controlled and externally financed.

For the United States, the deal broadens a map that already stretches across multiple African partners. For Congo, it binds migration policy to a moment of new diplomacy with Washington, new economic bargaining around minerals, and new scrutiny of what accepting transferred migrants will mean in practice.

Much now turns on implementation. DHS has said there is “no plan” to stop flights, Congo has said reviews will be individual, and facilities near Kinshasa are prepared to receive arrivals starting in April 2026.