SCOTUS Weighs Fate of Lawful Permanent Residents Charged with Moral Turpitude

(JFK AIRPORT, NEW YORK) – The U.S. Supreme Court will hear Blanche v. Lau, a case that asks whether federal immigration officers can treat returning lawful permanent residents as seeking admission based on pending criminal charges or accusations alone, rather than proof that they committed a crime involving moral turpitude.

The dispute centers on a narrow phrase in the Immigration and Nationality Act, but the reach is broad. SCOTUS will decide whether INA § 101(a)(13)(C) lets the Department of Homeland Security rely on charges at the border, or whether the agency must first show, with clear and convincing evidence, that a returning green card holder actually committed a disqualifying offense.

A ruling for the government would make it easier to place lawful permanent residents into a harsher legal category when they return from travel abroad. A ruling for Kwai Tai Lau would preserve the 2nd Circuit’s view that charges, standing alone, do not satisfy a statute that says a returning resident must have committed certain offenses before being treated as an applicant for admission.

Lau became a green card holder in 2008. He returned from Hong Kong in July 2012, and DHS officers at JFK Airport paroled him into the United States rather than admitting him, citing pending federal trademark counterfeiting charges that could qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

He later pleaded guilty in June 2013 and received two years’ probation. DHS then began removal proceedings in March 2014, treating him as inadmissible.

That distinction, parole rather than admission, shaped the case. Parolees face stricter consequences: crimes involving moral turpitude committed after parole can trigger inadmissibility, while admitted lawful permanent residents face deportability for a CIMT only if it occurs within five years of admission under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i).

If Lau had been admitted when he returned in July 2012, his later June 2013 conviction would have fallen outside the relevant five-year window tied to his 2008 lawful permanent resident status. By paroling him instead, DHS placed him in a posture where the later conviction exposed him to inadmissibility rules with no comparable five-year limit.

The statutory language at issue appears in INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v). It says returning lawful permanent residents “shall not be regarded as seeking an admission” unless they have committed certain offenses, including crimes involving moral turpitude.

Lau argued, and the 2nd Circuit agreed, that “committed” means more than being accused. The Board of Immigration Appeals had upheld DHS’s approach, but a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Richard J. Sullivan, reversed and required “clear and convincing evidence” that Lau had committed the offense at the time of reentry.

The panel relied on Board precedent in Matter of R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547 (BIA 1992). That precedent requires clear and convincing evidence of commission for crime involving moral turpitude determinations, and the 2nd Circuit said “charging documents alone—without more—could [not] carry DHS’s burden of demonstrating that a crime had been committed at the time of [Lau’s] reentry.”

The government now wants SCOTUS to reverse that ruling in the court’s 2026 term. The grant came after a post-January announcement, and no specific oral argument date had been confirmed as of April 2026.

At the Supreme Court, the legal question is likely to turn on evidence, timing and the meaning of admission. Must DHS show that a returning resident actually committed a CIMT before treating that person as seeking admission, or do pending charges suffice at the port of entry, even before any conviction?

Timing sits at the center of the dispute. Lau had pending charges when he arrived at JFK in July 2012, but he did not plead guilty until June 2013, almost a year later.

The 2nd Circuit treated that gap as decisive because the statute speaks in the past tense. Its reading requires proof that the offense had been committed by the time of reentry, not proof assembled later from a conviction entered months afterward.

The government position would give immigration officers more room to act at the border when a returning resident has unresolved criminal allegations. That approach could ease deportations of lawful permanent residents with criminal histories, particularly in cases where DHS seeks to classify them as applicants for admission before the underlying criminal case is finished.

Advocates have warned that the consequences would extend beyond serious criminal cases. They say a government win could affect 12.8 million lawful permanent residents and discourage travel by people with pending or minor charges, including those trying to respond to family emergencies abroad.

No noted circuit splits appear in the case. The 2nd Circuit ruling binds federal courts in Connecticut, New York and Vermont, while other circuits could continue to follow the Board of Immigration Appeals if SCOTUS rejects the 2nd Circuit’s reading.

That setting gives the case added weight despite its technical posture. A Supreme Court ruling would likely set a nationwide standard for how immigration officers and courts treat lawful permanent residents who leave the country while charges are pending.

The dispute also fits into a line of Supreme Court cases on the travel rights of green card holders. In Vartelas v. Holder, decided on March 28, 2012, the court rejected retroactive application of 1996 immigration changes to deny reentry to lawful permanent residents with pre-1996 convictions after brief trips abroad.

Vartelas did not decide the question presented in Blanche v. Lau, but it addressed the same statutory terrain: when a returning lawful permanent resident should be treated as seeking admission, and how far Congress intended border screening rules to reach into the lives of people who already hold permanent resident status.

Lau’s case arises from trademark counterfeiting charges, not a violent offense. Still, the legal principle before the court does not stop with his facts. If charges alone are enough, the government’s approach could apply whenever DHS alleges that a pending accusation involves moral turpitude.

That phrase has long carried weight in immigration law and has also drawn criticism for its breadth. In this case, the court is not being asked to rewrite the term; it is being asked to decide what proof the government needs before it can use that label to alter the status of a returning resident at the border.

Border processing itself matters because parole and admission are not interchangeable labels. Admission confirms that a lawful permanent resident reentered in that status, while parole leaves the person outside the formal admission framework and exposes that person to inadmissibility rules that can be harder to defeat.

The practical advice from immigration lawyers has remained constant while the case moves forward: lawful permanent residents facing criminal charges should consult counsel before international travel. The Supreme Court’s ruling could define, on a national scale, whether a pending case at home turns a trip abroad into a legal risk at the airport.

By the time SCOTUS hears the case, the facts will be settled and the criminal case long over. What remains is the statutory question the 2nd Circuit framed : whether “charging documents alone—without more—could [not] carry DHS’s burden of demonstrating that a crime had been committed at the time of [Lau’s] reentry.”