(IRELAND) — Ireland granted 14,247 visas to Russian citizens since 2022 and refused 465 applications, according to Department of Justice figures that have drawn political scrutiny over screening and security.

The figures show an approval rate of nearly 97% during the period since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with most of those permissions issued as short-term visas. A smaller share went to long-term applicants seeking to work or study.

Barry Andrews, a member of the European Parliament, raised the sharpest public concern, asking whether the State was taking sufficiently robust steps “to assess possible hostile intelligence activities by any individuals receiving visas.” His intervention tied the visa data to fears that some arrivals could include hostile intelligence agents.

Department of Justice figures show 11,548 of the permissions granted since 2022 were short-term visas. About 2,700 were long-term visas.

Short-term visas allow stays of up to 90 days. Long-term visas are decided case by case.

That split matters in practical terms because it shows where most movement took place. The larger volume came through short stays, while the long-term category covered a much smaller number of people entering for purposes such as work or study.

The numbers place Ireland inside a debate that has run across Europe since the invasion of Ukraine put Russian travel, residency rights and state vetting under closer examination. Andrews framed his concern around whether existing checks were strong enough to identify people whose purpose extended beyond tourism, study or employment.

His question did not allege that any named visa holder had engaged in espionage. It focused on the possibility that hostile intelligence agents could seek entry through ordinary visa channels and on whether the State’s screening system was built to detect that risk.

The data released by the department provide a broad picture of visa outcomes rather than a detailed map of who applied under each category. They show a high level of approvals and a far lower number of refusals during the post-2022 period.

Set beside the refusals total of 465, the grant figure of 14,247 has become the center of the political argument. Andrews’ intervention pushes that argument beyond immigration administration and into national security, where the standard question is not simply whether an applicant meets a formal requirement, but whether screening can identify hidden state-linked activity.

Ireland’s current framework, as reflected in the figures, separates short-term and long-term visas by purpose and duration. Short-term visas cover stays of up to 90 days, while long-term decisions are made case by case, a structure that gives officials room to assess work and study applications individually.

That arrangement also means the two categories present different screening demands. A high-volume short-term stream can create one kind of pressure, while case-by-case long-term decisions require individual assessment over a potentially longer stay.

No public breakdown in the figures identifies how many applications came from tourists, students or workers within those headline totals. The published count instead offers a top-line measure of approvals, refusals and the broad divide between short-term and long-term visas.

Andrews’ question lands in a diplomatic climate shaped by the war in Ukraine and by wider European concern about Russian state activity. Since 2022, scrutiny of Russian travel documents and entry permissions has sharpened across the bloc, particularly where governments see a possible overlap between civilian movement and intelligence gathering.

Ireland’s data do not by themselves prove any misuse of the visa system. They do show that the State approved almost all Russian applications lodged during a period of heightened political and security sensitivity.

That nearly 97% approval rate is likely to draw continued attention because it compresses a complex issue into one clear ratio: large-scale approval, limited refusal, and an unresolved question about how officials assess concealed security threats. Andrews put that question directly to the State when he asked about steps taken “to assess possible hostile intelligence activities by any individuals receiving visas.”

The concern is sharpened by the nature of visa screening itself. Officials must decide applications before arrival, and the distinction between a legitimate traveler and someone acting for an intelligence service may not be visible from a routine application unless background checks, intelligence sharing or other vetting tools reveal it.

Within the published totals, the short-term category dominates. The department granted 11,548 short-term visas, far above the roughly 2,700 long-term permissions, meaning the debate over 14,247 visas is tied most closely to temporary entry rather than extended residence.

That does not remove long-term cases from the discussion. Work and study visas can provide a longer presence in the country, which is one reason long-term applications are decided case by case.

The refusal figure, 465, also carries weight because it offers the only public clue in the data about how often the State blocked Russian applicants during the period. On its own, that number does not explain the reasons for refusal, but it stands in sharp contrast to the scale of approvals.

Political pressure often builds around such gaps, especially when officials release aggregated numbers rather than case-level explanations. A broad data set can answer how many people entered, while leaving open harder questions about who they were, how they were screened and what risks authorities judged manageable.

Those questions are now attached to one of the more striking migration figures in Ireland’s recent debate over Russia: 14,247 visas granted since 2022, against 465 refusals, with Barry Andrews warning that the system must be able to identify hostile intelligence agents before they cross the border.