6th Circuit Rules Trump’s Mandatory Detention Policy Unconstitutional in Contreras-Cervantes Case

(MICHIGAN, OHIO, KENTUCKY, AND TENNESSEE) — The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held on May 11, 2026, that the Trump administration’s recent “mandatory detention” policy is unconstitutional, restoring a path to immigration bond hearings for many noncitizens in pending removal proceedings across Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. In Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, a 2-1 panel said the government could not place long-term residents into mandatory immigration custody without the process that had long accompanied detention decisions under INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

The immediate practical effect is narrow but significant. Noncitizens in the Sixth Circuit who were denied bond hearings solely because the government treated them as subject to mandatory detention may now argue that they are entitled to an individualized custody hearing before an immigration judge. Release is not automatic. Immigration judges still weigh flight risk and danger under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19, and some people will remain detained after those hearings.

The case centers on a policy ICE adopted in July 2025. Under that reinterpretation, the government classified noncitizens who entered without inspection, including people who had lived in the United States for years, as “applicants for admission” under INA § 236(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b). That reading shifted them into a detention category the administration treated as mandatory, without bond hearings before an immigration judge. Before that change, people arrested in interior enforcement actions were often processed under § 1226(a), which generally permits a bond determination.

The Sixth Circuit’s holding matters because detention classification often decides the case’s first real question: whether the person can fight removal from home or from jail. In immigration court practice, custody status shapes access to counsel, document gathering, witness coordination, and family stability. The panel treated that deprivation as a due process problem, especially where the government’s new interpretation swept in long-term residents with no recent border encounter.

The administration had stronger support than many early district court challengers faced. In October 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals issued a published decision endorsing the new approach as national executive-branch policy. BIA published precedent can bind immigration judges unless a federal circuit court says otherwise within its jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit has now done that for the four states within its boundaries.

That creates a direct conflict between the courts and the agency line that had governed detention decisions over the past several months. It also places the Sixth Circuit alongside the Second Circuit, which also rejected the policy. By contrast, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have upheld the government’s approach. That split increases the odds of Supreme Court review, because immigration detention rules typically do not remain fractured for long among the circuits.

The facts that drove the ruling were straightforward. The case challenged the government’s attempt to convert people already living inside the country into applicants for admission for detention purposes, even though their arrests occurred well after entry and far from the border. The majority concluded that such a reclassification could not erase the process historically attached to detention under § 1226(a). Judge Eric Murphy dissented, leaving the panel divided over the government’s authority and the constitutional limits on detention without a bond hearing.

The legal backdrop is familiar to detention lawyers. Congress created several custody tracks in the Immigration and Nationality Act, and courts have spent years sorting out where each one begins and ends. In standard bond proceedings under INA § 236(a), immigration judges assess release using factors developed in agency precedent, including Matter of Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102 (BIA 1999), and Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006). Those cases do not control the constitutional question in Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, but they explain what many custody hearings in the Sixth Circuit may look like if detainees now get back into the § 1226(a) framework.

Advocates who challenged the policy framed the ruling as a rejection of detention without process. My Khanh Ngo, senior staff attorney with the Michigan ACLU’s Immigrants’ Rights Project, said courts had “yet again correctly rejected” the administration’s detention reinterpretation and called the result important for clients and their families. Amy Belsher of the New York Civil Liberties Union, addressing the parallel Second Circuit outcome, said the government could not detain millions of noncitizens without an opportunity to seek release. Those statements are advocacy positions, but they track the core legal concern identified by the Sixth Circuit: detention without an individualized hearing.

Noncitizens in pending removal proceedings within the Sixth Circuit may now have a stronger basis to request a custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge. Timing will matter. In many cases, counsel will want to identify whether ICE denied bond or classified the person under the July 2025 policy, then place the Sixth Circuit ruling before the immigration court as quickly as possible. People with serious criminal records, reinstated orders, or other statutory detention issues may face additional barriers, because detention authority can arise from provisions other than § 1226(a).

The ruling’s effect outside the Sixth Circuit is limited. Federal circuit decisions bind immigration courts only within that circuit unless the Supreme Court or the BIA resolves the issue nationally. That means people detained in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee may cite this decision directly, while people in the Fifth or Eighth Circuits face adverse appellate law for now. The split also creates uneven detention outcomes for similarly situated noncitizens, a factor that often pushes the Supreme Court to step in.

USCIS is not the primary agency here, because the dispute concerns ICE detention and immigration court custody proceedings under EOIR. Still, the consequences can spill into benefit cases. A detained respondent may struggle to collect records needed for asylum, adjustment, cancellation, or other relief. A person who obtains bond and release may be better positioned to prepare filings, appear with counsel, and meet immigration court deadlines. None of that changes the legal standard for relief itself, but it can affect how a case is litigated.

The next step is likely more litigation. The government may seek rehearing, ask the Supreme Court for review, or continue defending the policy where favorable circuit precedent already exists. Until then, Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft is the controlling rule in the 6th Circuit Court, and it may reshape detention hearings across the region in the short term. People in custody, and families trying to get them out, should not treat the ruling as self-executing. A favorable precedent still has to be raised, documented, and applied in an individual case.

Official materials on detention and immigration court procedure are available through the Executive Office for Immigration Review at justice.gov/eoir and through statutory references at 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Attorney help may be found through AILA Lawyer Referral. Cases involving detention classification, criminal history, prior removal orders, or circuit-specific law typically require prompt review by a qualified immigration attorney.

⚖️ Legal Disclaimer: This article provides general information about immigration law and is not legal advice. Immigration cases are highly fact-specific, and laws vary by jurisdiction. Consult a qualified immigration attorney for advice about your specific situation.