Second Circuit, United States V. Alisigwe, Judge Steven Menashi Backs Warrantless Border Phone Searches

The Second Circuit held on September 17, 2026, that border agents may manually search a traveler’s cellphone without a warrant or individualized suspicion. The decision applies the border-search exception to phones as property. It came in United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960.

Judge Steven Menashi wrote for the majority, grounding the ruling in existing rules for routine border searches. The court affirmed the search and rejected the effort to suppress cellphone evidence in the prosecution of Chinwendu Alisigwe. The judgment stands.

Judge Eunice C. Lee agreed that the search should be upheld, but not with the majority’s no-suspicion standard. She said cellphone searches at the border should require reasonable suspicion. The judges agreed on the result, not the rule behind it.

The decision governs federal courts in New York, Connecticut and Vermont. Border officers in those states may inspect a phone manually without first establishing reasonable suspicion, probable cause or obtaining a warrant, subject to the court’s account of a routine border search. Its reach stops there.

The court treated a phone like other property at the border

The majority applied the longstanding border-search exception under the Fourth Amendment. That doctrine permits routine searches at the border without a warrant or probable cause. Menashi’s opinion treated a manual phone search as an inspection of a traveler’s property, not as a separate category requiring heightened suspicion.

The opinion stated:

“Under our precedents, no suspicion is required before the government searches a traveler’s property at the border.”

“Because a cellphone is property, our precedents establish that the government does not need to have reasonable suspicion before searching a traveler’s cellphone at the border.”

The court also described the border itself as the basis for treating routine searches as reasonable. In its words, “Routine searches at the border are reasonable simply because those searches occur at the border.” The reasoning ties the phone search to established border doctrine, rather than creating a new test for digital devices.

That classification supplies the core of the holding. Because the majority regarded a cellphone as property, it concluded that the government did not need to show individualized suspicion before conducting the manual search at issue. The ruling does not set out a separate threshold for a traveler’s phone contents.

The opinion rejected separate Fourth and First Amendment phone rules

The court considered whether Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), required a different result. It concluded that the Supreme Court decision did not establish a separate warrant rule for border searches. The panel confined Riley to searches incident to arrest, rather than extending it to inspections at the border.

The decision therefore leaves the border-search exception in place despite the distinct treatment of phones in the arrest context. Menashi’s opinion did not treat a cellphone as automatically exempt from ordinary border-search principles. It applied those principles to the manual examination before the court.

The panel also rejected a separate First Amendment argument. It said, “Nor does the First Amendment impose an independent warrant requirement for searches of cellphones at the border.” The court thus refused to recognize an independent constitutional warrant requirement for the search on either ground.

Lee agreed with the judgment but wanted reasonable suspicion

Lee’s separate concurrence drew a line between sustaining this search and endorsing the majority’s rule. She joined the judgment, so Alisigwe’s challenge failed. But she would have required reasonable suspicion before agents searched a cellphone at the border.

That position would impose a threshold absent from the majority’s approach. The majority said existing precedent permits a routine search of property without suspicion; Lee favored a more demanding rule for phones. Her concurrence leaves the disagreement visible within the panel even as its judgment remains in force.

The case concerned suppression of evidence in a criminal prosecution. It did not decide an application for immigration relief, nor did it create a categorical immigration bar. The ruling may affect evidence collection in criminal or immigration-adjacent proceedings, but the legal question before the court was whether cellphone evidence should be suppressed.

The ruling binds courts in three states

The decision applies in New York, Connecticut and Vermont, the states within the court’s jurisdiction. It is binding precedent there unless the en banc court or the Supreme Court changes it. The panel’s holding does not itself establish a nationwide rule.

Within those states, the ruling gives border officers authority to conduct manual cellphone inspections without first demonstrating a warrant, probable cause or individualized suspicion, as long as the search falls within the court’s understanding of a routine border search. The decision strengthens the government’s position in litigation over manual phone searches.

The opinion also described its approach as consistent with a broader appellate trend allowing manual device searches at the border without a warrant. Other circuits may still address device searches differently, particularly when the government uses more advanced forensic methods. The decision does not resolve those cases or require every court nationwide to follow its reasoning.

The decision did not settle forensic extraction questions

The case addressed a manual search, not every method agents might use to examine a device. More intrusive forensic searches and off-site extraction may raise different legal questions. Those methods were not the central issue decided here.

That distinction limits what the opinion establishes. It provides a rule for the manual cellphone search before the panel, while leaving courts to consider whether deeper technical examinations fit within the same border-search framework. The majority’s property rationale does not itself answer that separate question.

The ruling leaves travelers and litigants in the three-state circuit with a clear standard for manual searches, but not a complete rule for every form of device examination. Future disputes may test the line between an ordinary inspection and forensic extraction. The panel did not draw it.

This article provides general information and is not legal advice. Consult a qualified immigration attorney about your specific case.