Misinformation Fosters Immigration Sentiment in Japan and Australia

(JAPAN) Misinformation is driving a sharp rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Japan and Australia in 2025, spilling from social media into street protests, election gains for hardline parties, and sudden policy reversals. In Japan, online rumors helped sink a government-backed exchange initiative within days and boosted far-right candidates in a July vote. In Australia, tens of thousands marched on August 31, 2025, fueled by coordinated online campaigns that portrayed migration as an existential threat and pushed slogans once confined to fringe groups.

In Japan, the far-right Sanseito party has converted online energy into electoral gains, jumping from 1 to 15 seats in the 248-member upper house in July 2025 after campaigning on a “Japanese First” agenda that vows to curb foreign workers and reinforce traditional family values. That platform, combined with a stream of viral claims about crime, welfare abuse, and cultural decline, has run alongside a broader political shift. Sanae Takaichi, elected Liberal Democratic Party leader on October 4, 2025 and expected to become prime minister, has championed tougher restrictions on foreigners, signaling a harder turn in national policy.

The spark and spread of misinformation have had immediate real-world consequences. In September, a program run by the government agency Japan International Cooperation Agency that designated four Japanese cities as “hometowns” for African countries—Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria and Tanzania—was misrepresented on social media as a plan to bring in large numbers of African immigrants. False claims cascaded across platforms, triggering angry phone calls to municipal offices and a surge of slanderous online comments targeting both Japan and Africa. Under intense pressure, the program was withdrawn on September 25, 2025. The next day, a demonstration against African immigration was held in front of Kisarazu’s city office, underscoring how quickly online narratives have moved people onto the streets.

At a Sanseito rally, some voters said the party had given voice to fears they felt were ignored.

“Many Japanese are frustrated by these problems, though we are too reserved to speak out. Mr. Kamiya is spelling them all out for us,” said Kenzo Hagiya, a retiree, referring to Sanseito leader Sohei Kamiya.

Politicians have amplified the mood by highlighting unconfirmed claims, including social media posts alleging that foreign tourists were abusing deer in Nara, stoking anger and suspicion that spread far beyond the original posts.

The tension has been palpable in places already navigating demographic change. In Kawaguchi in Saitama prefecture, where a Kurdish community has grown, accusations of public disturbances have sharpened local frictions and become fodder for national narratives about law and order. Yet government data undercut some of the claims that drive these stories. Authorities say the number of foreigners arrested for Penal Code violations is now about a third of what it was two decades ago. At the same time, police figures have become talking points used by both sides: 2024 National Police Agency statistics show shoplifting by foreign visitors accounted for 22.6% of cases, or 6.7 times higher than the rate for Japanese citizens at 3.4%, figures often cited by anti-immigration activists and critics alike to argue over the significance and context of tourist crime.

Sanseito’s rise has been amplified by social platforms that reward outrage and speed. Kamiya’s speeches and viral clips promise to curb immigration and reassert cultural boundaries, while party organizers circulate alerts and slogans that travel quickly through messaging channels and video apps. The party’s growth from a single upper-house seat to 15 in just one election illustrates how fast anti-immigration sentiment can shift the political map when it is fueled by daily feeds of polarizing content. Takaichi’s ascent further consolidates the trend, with her calls for stricter controls on foreigners interpreted by analysts as a broader green light for a tougher national stance.

Australia has followed a parallel path, with digital misinformation setting the stage for one of the largest coordinated anti-immigration mobilizations in years. On August 31, 2025, March for Australia organized rallies across four major cities: up to 8,000 people in Sydney, 15,000 in Adelaide, 5,000 in Melbourne, and 10,000 in Perth. The group’s message resonated with nationalists and far-right activists who have built loyal followings online: “This march is a stand for the people, culture, and nation that built Australia – and for our right to decide its future.” Among those seeking attention at the Melbourne protest was neo-Nazi figure Thomas Sewell, who used the event to promote “remigration,” the deportation of non-white Australians.

Behind the slogans, organizers sought to mainstream more extreme ideas. Leaked recordings from a lead protest organizer included coaching on how to escalate messaging:

“Australian heritage, culture, way of life. Next step, protect European culture, heritage, way of life. The next step is protect white heritage.”

The language tracked with a monthslong push by anonymous and pseudonymous accounts to saturate TikTok, X, and Facebook with short, punchy videos about a supposed migrant invasion and election rigging. AAP FactCheck found AI-generated avatar videos repeating the claims, sometimes with violent overtones, while accounts such as LoveMyAu and SaltyHypsi promoted the marches and circulated conspiracies to hundreds of thousands of users.

The combination proved potent because it blended real economic frustrations with distorted claims about cause and effect. Protesters frequently blamed migrants for Australia’s housing crisis and rising living costs, even as academic research points to slow construction and regulation as the primary drivers of shortages. An Adelaide organizer captured the mood among many marchers:

“Whilst there’s not enough homes, not enough resources, I think we need to temper migration down and then have a national conversation as adults about the continuation of migration figures.”

Political leaders have been split on how to respond. Social Services Minister Tanya Plibersek defended a reduced migration intake, while former prime minister Tony Abbott and rising support for the One Nation Party have pushed for tighter rules. By November 2025, One Nation’s primary vote was at 12%, edging past the Greens at 11%, a shift that hardened the debate inside mainstream parties.

Researchers and legal experts say the digital ecosystem has done much of the work. With platforms slow to moderate coordinated campaigns, and politicians wary of alienating energised online constituencies, false narratives have repeated unchecked long enough to seem familiar, or even true. Daniel Ghezelbash, director of the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, argues that immigrants and refugees are being blamed for economic problems for prejudicial and political reasons, despite their substantial contributions to society and the workforce. The result, analysts say, is a manufactured sense of immigration “crisis” that builds through repetition, creating a loop in which public anger, policy proposals and online content feed each other.

The same loop has been visible in Japan. After the JICA “hometown” initiative was smeared as a mass immigration plan, phones in city halls rang incessantly, and Facebook and X brimmed with slurs against Africans and those supporting exchanges. Even the subsequent withdrawal on September 25, 2025 did little to halt the online churn; instead, activists pointed to the decision as proof of a hidden agenda, reinforcing a belief that immigration pressures were imminent. The September 26 protest at Kisarazu’s city office, though local in scale, served as a template as organizers elsewhere tested similar narratives about foreign crime, welfare strain, and cultural erosion.

In both countries, the politics of identity have collided with economic uncertainty and public fatigue after years of pandemic recovery. In Japan, a labour shortage and ageing population have long tested the country’s careful approach to migration, but recent developments suggest a stronger backlash against expanding foreign labour programs. Sohei Kamiya, with his “Japanese First” frame, has tapped voters who say they feel dismissed by elites; rallies showcase placards about protecting children, preserving tradition, and rejecting “globalist” schemes. Takaichi’s leadership strengthens the likelihood of tighter rules, and party insiders note that she has amplified unverified claims that inflame public concern—even as official statistics show long-term declines in foreigner-related crime.

Australia’s protests drew in a cross-section of groups, from families angry over rent to hardline activists seeking to normalize ethno-nationalist ideas. The presence of Sewell, and the leaked guidance that stepped messaging from generic appeals to explicit “white heritage,” placed the movement’s ideological aims in full view. Yet the mainstream framing—couched as defending “heritage, culture, way of life”—gave organizers cover to recruit those who might not identify as far-right but share unease about rapid change. Political inaction on content moderation, combined with tech platforms’ reluctance to police coordinated campaigns, allowed falsehoods to persist long enough to be treated as conventional wisdom in some circles.

The consequences have been immediate and measurable. In Japan, Sanseito’s surge from 1 to 15 upper-house seats in July signaled a new force capable of shaping debate inside and outside the ruling party. In Australia, turnout estimates—up to 8,000 in Sydney, 15,000 in Adelaide, 5,000 in Melbourne, 10,000 in Perth—showed the reach of online rallying, especially when reinforced by accounts that churned out AI-driven videos at scale. Lawmakers in both countries now face pressure to tighten immigration policies or risk ceding ground to rivals who promise more dramatic action.

Counter-messaging has struggled to keep pace. Fact-checks about crime trends in Japan, including data showing foreigners arrested under the Penal Code have fallen to one third of the level two decades ago, gain far less traction than viral clips depicting chaos or cruelty. Headlines about isolated incidents involving tourists can dominate feeds for days, while corrections are buried. In Australia, efforts to explain the drivers of the housing crisis—slow construction and planning constraints, rather than immigration—often read as evasions to audiences primed by weeks of content drawing a straight line from arrivals to rent hikes.

Faith leaders and civil society figures have urged a turn toward compassion and calm, warning that conspiracies are hardening into daily politics. Hazrat Mirza Masroor Ahmad, the Khalifatul Masih V, has offered a perspective centered on the positive roles migrants play in society and the moral need to resist scapegoating, a message welcomed by groups trying to lower the temperature. But the institutional response remains uneven. Without a consistent push from governments and platforms, researchers warn, conspiratorial frames—such as an orchestrated “migrant invasion” or manipulated elections—gain legitimacy simply by being repeated and rarely challenged in the venues where they spread.

The stakes are immediate for communities caught in the crossfire. Kurdish residents in Kawaguchi describe tense encounters in parks and on trains as rumors of disorder circulate. African embassies in Japan privately complained about the slander that followed the JICA program’s announcement, which had been pitched as cultural exchange rather than relocation. In Australia, migrants reported harassment near rally routes on August 31, 2025, and advocacy groups documented spikes in online abuse targeting non-white Australians in the days after the marches.

Political parties are recalibrating. In Japan, Takaichi’s LDP faces pressure from Sanseito’s gains to demonstrate tougher enforcement, even if official numbers do not support claims of a crime wave. In Australia, the One Nation Party’s primary vote reaching 12% in November 2025—above the Greens at 11%—has already nudged debate toward restriction, with centrist leaders weighing whether to embrace smaller migration targets to placate anxious voters. These shifts carry policy consequences: exchange programs become harder to launch, work visa pathways face new hurdles, and public services prepare for tensions that may flare quickly when a rumor ignites.

Researchers and advocates argue that governments must act on two fronts at once: address the economic stresses that create fertile ground for scapegoating, and invest in clear, timely communication that meets people where they are—often on the same platforms where conspiracies now spread. That includes working with educators, local officials and community leaders to translate statistics into plain language. It also means faster responses when misinformation takes aim at specific programs, as with the JICA “hometown” initiative, so that vacuum does not become narrative.

The past months in Japan and Australia show how fast online claims can set political agendas, especially when they tap into identity and insecurity. Anti-immigration sentiment thrives when misinformation goes unchallenged and when leaders echo unverified stories that confirm existing fears. The result is visible in parliament seats won, marches marshaled, and programs canceled. Whether the tide turns may depend on how quickly institutions adapt to an information environment where a single viral post can outweigh years of data—and where the next protest can be organized in the time it takes a video to loop.