Europe Expands Return Hubs, Frontex Role in Deportations Amid Trump-Like Shift

(ITALY) — European Union lawmakers and governments moved this week to widen the bloc’s deportation powers, backing external “return hubs,” longer detention in some cases and wider use of Frontex-assisted enforcement as Italy’s model in Albania draws interest from other member states.

The shift accelerated on Mar 26, 2026, when the European Parliament voted 389–206, with 32 abstentions, to make it easier for EU countries to set up detention-based return hubs outside the bloc and to let coalitions of member states strike their own deals with non-EU countries.

That vote came as the EU pressed ahead with a broader returns system that would let states record a “European return order” in the Schengen Information System, enabling other countries to enforce a deportation decision, and would allow transfers to third countries through hub-style agreements. The measures form part of a drive to raise return rates and speed deportations across the bloc.

Europe’s move now goes beyond a single parliamentary vote. On Mar 9, 2026, the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties Committee adopted its negotiating line on the Return Regulation by 41–32–1, putting on the table detention of up to 24 months in certain cases, hub-style third-country transfers, EU-wide entry bans for people who do not depart and the ERO system in SIS.

That committee position also excluded unaccompanied minors from hub transfers and required fundamental-rights monitoring during removals. It set a target date of July 1, 2027 for mutual recognition of return decisions, based on the Commission proposal.

Member states had already mapped out their own line. On Dec 8, 2025, the Council’s common position said the Return Regulation would “enable member states to establish return hubs in third countries,” impose cooperation obligations on returnees, including biometrics and documents, and allow sanctions for non-cooperation, including possible imprisonment under national law.

The Council text also foresees extended detention and longer-than-10-year entry bans for people deemed security risks. It plans phased mutual recognition of return decisions, with the European Commission to assess making that mandatory after two years of application.

Taken together, the Parliament and Council positions show how the bloc is building the legal structure for wider deportations inside and outside EU territory. They also place agencies and databases at the center of enforcement, with Frontex supporting returns and eu-LISA handling the IT systems behind SIS connectivity.

The debate sharpened further on Mar 29, 2026, as fresh scrutiny focused on how the EU is pairing new legal tools with operational tactics that include tracking, raids and external return hubs in Africa and elsewhere. Critics have likened parts of that approach to tactics championed by former U.S. President Donald Trump.

“The EU… is expanding its powers to track, raid and deport migrants to ‘return hubs’ in third countries in Africa and elsewhere,”

while far-right parties have openly praised Trump’s deportation policies.

In Parliament, supporters and opponents described the Mar 26 vote in starkly different terms. Swedish Democrat MEP Charlie Weimers hailed it as a “new era,” while MEP Mélissa Camara called it a “historic setback.”

Several right-of-center and far-right parties cast the vote as ushering in “the era of deportations.” That rhetoric has helped turn what began as a technical negotiation over returns law into one of the EU’s sharpest political battles over migration.

Italy’s arrangements with Albania have become the clearest test case for the new approach. Italy opened one reception and processing site in Shëngjin and a detention center in Gjadër, a former airbase, in late 2024, then began transfers in 2025.

The sites were designed as an external processing and detention model outside EU territory but under an EU member state’s authority. Capacity figures have varied, with Gjadër described as designed for thousands of beds and Italian statements in 2024–25 floating an annual processing figure of up to 36,000, though use in 2025 remained modest.

That changed in early 2026. Italy resumed and increased transfers, and late February 2026 reporting indicated about 90 people were being held in Gjadër, up from a few dozen at a time in 2025.

Italy also widened its maritime powers. On Feb 11, 2026, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s cabinet approved a bill allowing the navy to block vessels in international waters for up to six months in certain security-threat scenarios, a measure aimed at curbing NGO rescue ships and smuggling boats.

Other countries are now studying or discussing similar models. Greece’s migration minister, Thanos Plevris, said on Feb 18, 2026 that his government was working with Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark to set up deportation hubs “preferably in Africa,” with larger member states leading talks with candidate host countries.

That push matters because the Mar 26 parliamentary vote explicitly opened the door for groups of member states to strike hub arrangements together. Coalitions could spread cost and political risk while creating a more uniform returns system.

Inside the bloc, enforcement is also expanding. Frontex officers joined Belgian police raids in 2024 to detain and deport migrants, one example of how the agency’s role has moved beyond border management and toward direct support for removals.

Human-rights groups say similar tactics are spreading alongside surveillance technology including drones, thermal cameras and satellites. In practical terms, the return hubs model and the tougher internal enforcement model are advancing together, not separately.

The proposed European return order is central to that system. Once entered into the Schengen Information System, a return decision issued in one member state could be recognized and acted on elsewhere, reducing the need for repeated national procedures and tightening coordination across borders.

That data architecture depends heavily on eu-LISA, the EU agency responsible for large-scale IT systems. Its work on SIS integration would support both the ERO and the broader enforcement of return decisions under the framework now under negotiation.

The wider migration pact provides the timetable. The Asylum Procedures Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1348, applies from June 12, 2026 and repeals Directive 2013/32/EU on July 11, 2026.

The Screening Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1356, also applies from June 12, 2026. The EU law on a common safe countries of origin list is aligned to take effect the same day.

Those measures were among 10 legal instruments adopted in May 2024 under the Pact on Migration and Asylum. The Commission’s implementation plan says national systems must be ready by June 2026, with Frontex handling returns support and eu-LISA supporting the IT side.

The return hubs concept itself did not appear overnight. The Commission’s “Common European System for Returns” proposal of Mar 11, 2025 first floated return hubs as part of an EU-wide ruleset intended to raise the bloc’s low return rates.

That proposal said third-country arrangements had to be legally compliant and respect international law, including non-refoulement. Parliament’s committee text later dropped one Commission-proposed obligation that would have required each country to proactively “detect” illegally staying non-EU nationals.

Even so, the direction of policy has become harder, not softer. Parliament’s line mirrors the Council on mutual enforcement through ERO/SIS, accepts hub transfers “based upon an agreement … including the so-called return hubs,” and keeps detention available for up to 24 months in cases such as risk of absconding, non-cooperation or security risk.

The negotiations are not finished. Parliament still needs plenary endorsement of its Mar 9 committee line before trilogues with the Council can settle a final text, but the political signal from the Mar 26 vote was that a majority of lawmakers now back the externalization of returns in principle.

That has implications for countries on the bloc’s edges and beyond it. Host states for return hubs would become part of the EU’s deportation chain even while remaining outside the union, and countries inside the bloc would gain new authority to coordinate removals through shared databases and mutual enforcement.

For Italy, the immediate stakes are practical as well as political. Its Albania facilities have shifted from a closely watched experiment to a live template for the return hubs idea, and the increase to about 90 people in Gjadër in late February 2026 has given other capitals a working example to study.

For the EU as a whole, the next milestones are already fixed. June 12, 2026 will bring the application of the Asylum Procedures Regulation, the Screening Regulation and the safe countries of origin list, while July 1, 2027 stands as the target date in Parliament’s line for mutual recognition of return decisions.

Those dates sit alongside ongoing Council debriefs from Dec 2025 and Parliament’s negotiations since Mar 9, 2026, all feeding into the final bargaining ahead. What is already clear is that Europe is no longer debating return hubs as a distant idea. It is building the laws, systems and alliances to make them part of its deportations policy.