A 68.49% surge in dhs.gov traffic has coincided with the rollout of CBP Home, a self-deportation platform branded under Project Homecoming. Together, those signals point to a sharp federal pivot: away from asylum-intake logistics associated with CBP One, and toward incentivized departures backed by aggressive “leave now” messaging.
Section 1: Overview and Context
CBP Home is a government mobile app and process channel that lets certain noncitizens in the United States declare an intent to depart and request help leaving. It turns “I’m leaving” into an administrative workflow: tell the government you plan to go, then the government coordinates the exit under program rules.
CBP One, by contrast, was widely known as an appointment tool tied to asylum-adjacent processing. It functioned as an intake gate. CBP Home flips the direction and recasts a mobile platform from managing entries and appointments into managing exits.
DHS has highlighted the jump in dhs.gov traffic because it supports a key communications goal: showing public engagement with enforcement-oriented services. Website growth can reflect real demand, but it can also reflect intense public attention driven by ads, news coverage, and fear of enforcement.
Either way, DHS is treating traffic as a marker that the message is landing. Project Homecoming’s tone has been summed up as “Stay Out and Leave Now.” That kind of campaign matters because compliance programs work only if people hear the offer, believe it applies to them, and trust the follow-through.
Ads do not change immigration law. They can shape behavior fast.
| Program/Platform | Original Purpose | Current Emphasis | Incentives |
|---|---|---|---|
| CBP One | Appointment-based intake tied to asylum-adjacent processing | Phased out and replaced in this policy posture | None as a central feature |
| CBP Home | Rebranded successor platform for user-initiated departure processing | Voluntary departure and self-deportation signaling under Project Homecoming | Cash bonus, travel assistance, civil fines forgiveness (program-defined) |
Section 2: Official Statements and Dates
March 10, 2025 marked the program’s public launch, with Kristi Noem and Acting CBP Commissioner Pete Flores introducing CBP Home as a way to declare intent to voluntarily depart. Noem framed it as a path that “may still have the opportunity to return legally in the future,” while warning that those who do not depart will be found and deported.
Flores described the app as a straightforward option to leave before “harsher consequences.” January 20, 2026 brought a DHS year-end review for 2025. The language emphasized “records,” “rule of law,” and removals, placing departures inside a broader enforcement narrative.
January 21, 2026 added two layers of messaging. A DHS Spokesperson emphasized “action and reform” under Donald J. Trump and Secretary Noem, while also highlighting border security and removals. Secretary Noem then described the scale of “departures” and separated “self-deportations” from deportations.
Definitions matter here. “Departures” can be used as an umbrella term that may include people who leave on their own, people who accept voluntary departure, and people removed under formal orders. Each category can carry different legal effects.
| Date | Statement/Announcement | Key Point |
|---|---|---|
| March 10, 2025 | Noem and Pete Flores introduce CBP Home | CBP Home presented as a channel to declare intent to depart, with warnings of stricter consequences if not used |
| January 20, 2026 | DHS year-end review for 2025 | DHS frames 2025 as a record-setting year focused on security, removals, and rule-of-law messaging |
| January 21, 2026 | DHS Spokesperson statement | DHS ties enforcement posture to the Trump administration’s first year back in office |
| January 21, 2026 | Kristi Noem statement | DHS describes totals and distinguishes self-deportations from deportations |
Section 3: Key Facts and Statistics
DHS is treating traffic growth as a proxy for engagement with its enforcement-and-exit message. That can mean curiosity, compliance planning, or fear-driven checking of rules and options. It does not prove that every visitor used CBP Home, or that the app alone drove the increase.
Pageviews and unique visitors measure different behavior. Pageviews rise when people click around, return repeatedly, or share links. Unique visitors rise when more individuals show up at least once.
A large ad campaign can lift both, even if actual enrollment changes less. Departure totals also need careful reading. “Self-departures” are not the same as “deportations” or “removals.” A formal removal usually follows a government order and can trigger longer bars to returning.
A self-departure may still carry serious consequences, especially if unlawful presence has already accrued. Correlation is not causation: a traffic spike can coincide with CBP Home, interior enforcement operations, and broader news cycles. Counting methods also vary.
Some people depart more than once over time. Some exits never get matched cleanly to a specific app event.
Section 4: Incentives and Program Details (Project Homecoming)
Project Homecoming pairs departure processing with three incentive buckets. First, DHS described a cash “exit bonus” structure. The headline amounts have changed over time, and DHS linked higher amounts to a limited window.
Readers should treat any dollar figure as conditional on program rules and timing. Second, DHS described travel help. In practice, that means assistance arranging a one-way trip to a person’s home country (unspecified in detail).
Travel logistics can be simple for some people and nearly impossible for others, depending on identity documents and consular cooperation. Third, DHS described relief tied to civil fines forgiveness for certain failure-to-depart penalties.
That phrase has legal weight. Civil fines are not the same as criminal charges. Forgiveness also is not a pardon for immigration violations. It is a narrow concept that depends on eligibility.
DHS also described an enforcement posture during processing, including language about being de-prioritized for ICE detention while departure is arranged. That should be read as a policy preference, not a guarantee.
Screening, outstanding warrants, prior removal orders, or other flags can change outcomes. A typical participation flow is simple on paper: enroll, provide information, confirm departure planning, and then depart with confirmation recorded.
Real life can be messier. Missed flights, paperwork delays, or changing enforcement activity can affect the timeline.
| Incentive Component | What It Covers | Legal/Policy Caveats |
|---|---|---|
| Cash/bonus | Program-defined payment tied to verified departure | Often time-limited and eligibility-based; not a promise for every registrant |
| Travel assistance | Help arranging transportation to a home country | Depends on documents and routing; may be constrained by diplomatic and carrier limits |
| Civil fines forgiveness | Relief from certain civil failure-to-depart penalties | Narrow scope; does not erase unlawful presence or removal history |
| De-prioritization for detention during processing | Claimed lower detention priority while arranging departure | Discretionary and conditional; enforcement priorities can override |
Section 5: Significance and Economic Implications
DHS’s strategy has shifted from managing a front-end appointment tool toward paying for exits and advertising them. That is a compliance model: spend money upfront to reduce downstream costs. A large messaging push can drive app adoption quickly and can also drive site traffic even among people who never enroll.
Curiosity, fear, and rumor control all send users to official pages. The cost-savings claim rests on a basic comparison: traditional arrest-to-removal can require officers, detention beds, transport, medical screening, and court or processing time. Contracting costs add up fast.
A voluntary departure workflow can be cheaper when a person books into an exit path without custody time. Still, “cheaper” does not mean “simple.” Incentives must be administered, verified, and audited. Travel requires coordination.
Any system that mixes ads, payments, and enforcement threats invites scrutiny over accuracy and fairness.
Section 6: Impact on Individuals and Civil/Policy Implications
Voluntary departure and formal removal can lead to very different legal outcomes. A removal order typically carries clear future consequences. Many people face reentry bars that can run years, or even permanent restrictions, depending on the basis.
A self-departure through CBP Home may avoid some of the consequences linked to a removal order, but it does not erase all problems. Unlawful presence can still trigger bars. Prior orders, misrepresentation findings, or criminal issues can still block future admission.
Departure can also affect the ability to pursue certain relief. Pending or future USCIS processes add another layer: family petitions may continue, but a departure can change consular processing needs and timing. Asylum and withholding claims may be abandoned if a person leaves, in many cases.
Work authorization tied to a pending application may end. Parole-based permissions can lapse.
Legal implications warning: Voluntary departure, self-deportation, and formal removal can each affect future admissibility and reentry bars differently. Leaving the United States can also cut off or complicate USCIS-related options such as asylum-based protection, work authorization, or family-based processing.
Humanitarian concerns also shape the picture. Some people report feeling trapped if return travel is hard to arrange, including cases linked to limited diplomatic relations. Registering intent to depart is not the same as having a flight in hand; that gap can increase risk if enforcement ramps up while travel remains stalled.
Interior enforcement campaigns can change behavior overnight. Fear of detention can push people toward CBP Home even when their legal situation is complex. For some, the app may feel like the least-bad option. For others, it may create irreversible consequences.
Readers should verify current official guidance and consult qualified counsel before acting on incentives.
This analysis addresses policy and potential legal implications; it does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult qualified immigration counsel for individualized guidance.
