- UN Special Rapporteur Alice Jill Edwards said governments cannot send people to places with a real risk of torture.
- Her July 28, 2026 paper rejected outsourcing asylum decisions to third countries and faster removals without individualized review.
- The report cited 117.8 million displaced worldwide and warned diplomatic assurances cannot justify unlawful returns.
Alice Jill Edwards, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, warned July 28 that governments cannot remove people to places where they face a real risk of torture, even when border policies rely on third countries or diplomatic agreements.
Her warning came in a formal position paper on July 28, 2026. It addressed the legal limits of accelerated removals, outsourced asylum processing and return arrangements that shift people beyond a state’s immediate territory.
The rule is absolute. A government may control entry and manage its borders, but it cannot transfer a person when substantial grounds indicate a risk of torture or other irreparable harm.
“States have the right to control their borders. but there is an absolute line: no one can be sent to a place where they face a real risk of torture.”
Edwards said states must examine the danger faced by each person. A faster procedure does not remove that obligation.
“Returns may be faster. Procedures may be reformed. States may cooperate with third countries. What they cannot do is design the individual out of the process.”
The position rests on Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, which bars sending someone to a place where substantial grounds support a belief that the person would face torture. The prohibition does not depend on whether a return agreement exists.
Third-country arrangements do not transfer legal responsibility
The paper challenged the growing use of externalized migration systems. Under those arrangements, governments send asylum processing, detention or return operations to countries outside their own territory.
A bilateral deal does not erase responsibility for an unlawful transfer. Nor does placing a person in a third country eliminate the need to assess the person’s risk of torture there.
The warning addressed several policies identified in the research. They include the Council of Europe’s Chișinău Declaration, adopted in May 2026, the EU Return Regulation approved June 1, 2026, and accelerated removal programs in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The EU measure expanded the use of “return hubs” in non-EU countries to process rejected asylum seekers. The arrangements place the location of processing at the center of the legal dispute, but the duty follows the person facing removal.
Edwards also addressed proposed United Kingdom measures involving artificial-intelligence facial recognition to assess the age of younger asylum seekers. Such technology, she said, cannot replace an individualized human-rights assessment.
The Council of Europe declaration sought to limit how courts interpret the European Convention on Human Rights when deportation cases are before them. Edwards’ position paper maintained that procedural or institutional changes cannot authorize a transfer exposing someone to torture.
Written promises cannot cure an identified risk
Edwards gave particular attention to diplomatic assurances, which governments sometimes use when returning a person to a country with a record of torture or mistreatment.
“Diplomatic assurances must never become paper promises used to legitimise an otherwise unlawful return.”
The warning does not treat a government’s promise as a substitute for examining the actual danger. Officials must still determine whether substantial grounds show that the person could face torture or other irreparable harm after removal.
That assessment is individual. A general commitment from a receiving state cannot, by itself, remove facts about detention, conflict, persecution or previous abuse.
Edwards rejected the idea that migration management and human-rights protection present only two opposing choices.
“Too often. the discussion is framed as a choice between protecting human rights and enabling States to manage migration. This is a false choice.”
The position paper therefore draws a line between controlling borders and carrying out a return. The first remains a sovereign power. The second remains constrained by the prohibition on torture.
Conflicts and removals show the stakes
The paper highlighted Sudanese nationals whom Egyptian authorities have forcibly deported toward active war zones. The example places the legal question beyond formal return documents: the conditions awaiting a person after removal also matter.
Yusra Mardini, a UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador and former Olympic swimmer, described the human consequences during testimony on July 28. She spoke of the “psychological terror” experienced by families forced to return to war-torn homes in Syria.
The broader displacement figures help explain the scale of the pressure on asylum systems. UNHCR data released in mid-2026 recorded 117.8 million people forcibly displaced worldwide by the end of 2025, including 35.6 million refugees.
Those numbers do not change the legal test. A large caseload, a bilateral agreement or a faster system cannot make torture an acceptable destination.
Barham Salih, the UN Refugees Chief and former President of Iraq, spoke July 28 as the Refugee Convention reached its 75th anniversary. He said: “Too often, refugees are portrayed as burdens or threats rather than as fellow human beings.”
U.S. third-country removals remain part of the dispute
The research also points to a June 2025 Supreme Court ruling that stayed protections for noncitizens facing “third-country removals.” Those removals can send people to countries other than their own, potentially without an opportunity to raise torture claims about the receiving country.
That issue reflects the same legal problem identified in the position paper. A person may face danger in the country selected for removal even if officials do not plan to send the person to the country of nationality.
A third-country destination therefore requires its own risk assessment. The relevant question is where the person will actually be sent and what may happen there.
The position paper’s language also reaches systems that rely on speed. Edwards said governments may reform procedures, but they cannot remove the individual from the decision. That requirement may affect screening, detention, appeals and transfer decisions at several stages.
The prohibition applies before the transfer occurs
Article 3’s standard turns on “substantial grounds” for believing that torture is likely. The rule concerns prospective harm, so officials must assess the conditions awaiting the person before authorizing removal.
A state’s border authority does not answer that question. Neither does the existence of a return hub, a formal agreement or a promise from another government.
The position paper arrives as governments expand cooperation with third countries and seek quicker ways to process rejected claims. It leaves the individual risk inquiry as the legal checkpoint that those policies cannot bypass.
This article provides general information and is not legal advice. Consult a qualified immigration attorney about your specific case.
