- NTSB investigators are focusing on tower staffing during the fatal LaGuardia runway collision involving a CRJ and fire truck.
- Two controllers were reportedly performing the work of four positions when the 11:35 p.m. accident occurred.
- A preliminary report is expected within 30 days, probing fatigue, workload, and human factors in the midnight shift.
(NEW YORK) — Federal investigators examined whether controller staffing and relief procedures at LaGuardia were followed on the night an Air Canada Express CRJ collided with a Port Authority fire truck on Runway 4, an accident that killed two pilots and injured 41 passengers.
The collision happened around 11:35 p.m. EDT on a Sunday night after a controller cleared the fire truck to cross Runway 4 to address an unusual odor from a United plane, then called “stop, stop, stop” seconds before the CRJ landed and struck the vehicle.
By the third day of the investigation, the damaged plane and the fire truck still remained on Runway 4. Four people were hospitalized.
Tower Staffing Under Review
LaGuardia’s air traffic control tower had two controllers on duty at the time, and they were performing the work of four positions, according to information under review by the National Transportation Safety Board. The NTSB describes that arrangement as standard operating procedure for the midnight shift.
That staffing setup has become a central focus of the inquiry into the LaGuardia collision. Investigators are examining the two controllers’ multiple duties, along with the failure to relieve the involved controller immediately after the crash despite protocol, and whether relief was unavailable.
Post-crash audio captured a controller telling another flight’s crew, “I was here. I tried to reach out to my staff, and we were dealing with an emergency earlier, and I messed up.”
The NTSB has not detailed the controllers’ positions or backgrounds. Its investigation is probing fatigue, workload, situational awareness and human factors during the nighttime shift, with a preliminary report expected within 30 days.
Staffing Numbers and Airport Capacity
Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said Monday that more than one controller was present in the tower that night. He also said LaGuardia employs 33 certified controllers, four short of the Federal Aviation Administration’s target of 37.
Duffy said the airport also has seven trainees, who require more than a year of LaGuardia-specific training because of the airport’s complex airspace. The Department of Transportation confirmed that multiple controllers were working, but did not disclose the exact number.
Those figures placed LaGuardia in a different category from many U.S. airports facing wider staffing shortages, though experts still questioned how the tower was operating at the time of the crash. LaGuardia is considered better staffed than most amid nationwide shortages.
Former NTSB Chair Robert Sumwalt and aviation analyst Greg Bubb raised questions about whether controllers were handling dual roles, working extended shifts or dealing with fatigue from varying schedules. The NTSB regards late-night two-controller staffing as typical, but also as a long-standing concern.
That tension — routine staffing on paper and operational strain in practice — has sharpened scrutiny of what happened in the final seconds before the collision. A controller had cleared the fire truck to cross the runway, then tried to stop the crossing as the Air Canada Express CRJ came in to land.
Investigators are now looking at how the duties in the tower were divided between the two controllers, and whether the workload affected decision-making during a fast-moving emergency. They are also examining why the controller involved was not relieved immediately after the collision.
Earlier Safety Warnings at LaGuardia
The inquiry comes against a backdrop of prior safety warnings involving LaGuardia operations. Reports submitted to NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System had already flagged controller miscommunications and near runway crossings involving landing aircraft.
Those reports included incidents in July and December 2024. Pilots described runway-crossing concerns and communication problems, and some linked the pace of operations at LaGuardia to the kinds of risks that drew warnings before the 2025 Potomac mid-air collision.
One of those reports urged, “Please do something.”
The earlier warnings did not involve this crash, but they have added context to questions about how safely the airport manages traffic when controllers are covering multiple roles and aircraft movements continue late at night. LaGuardia’s airspace and ground operations are widely regarded as complex, a point Duffy cited when discussing the lengthy training required for new controllers.
Human Factors and the Midnight Shift
For investigators, the staffing issue is not limited to headcount. The NTSB’s focus on human factors points to a broader review of how controllers function during the midnight shift, when fewer people are working and one emergency can quickly overlap with another.
The controller’s remark in the recorded audio suggested exactly that kind of overlap. He said, “I was here. I tried to reach out to my staff, and we were dealing with an emergency earlier, and I messed up.”
That statement has drawn attention because it came after the crash and because investigators are examining whether the controller should have been replaced right away. The NTSB has not yet said whether relief was impossible, delayed or overlooked, but it is treating the issue as part of the formal investigation.
What is already clear is the sequence investigators are piecing together. A fire truck had been sent toward Runway 4 to respond to an unusual odor from a United plane, a controller authorized it to cross, and then the landing aircraft arrived before the crossing could be stopped.
Seconds mattered. The urgent “stop, stop, stop” came too late to prevent the collision.
The crash killed both pilots aboard the Air Canada Express CRJ. Forty-one passengers were injured, and four people remained hospitalized by the third day of the investigation.
The continuing presence of the aircraft and truck on Runway 4 underscored how fresh the inquiry remains. Investigators still have to sort through the tower’s staffing decisions, the controllers’ assignments, the timing of the runway crossing clearance and the response after impact.
LaGuardia’s staffing numbers will likely remain part of that discussion, but they may not settle it. With 33 certified controllers against a target of 37 and seven trainees in the pipeline, the airport stands above many others in a strained national system, yet experts say staffing totals alone do not answer whether controllers were stretched too thin during a late-night emergency.
That is why the NTSB’s review reaches beyond simple vacancy counts. Fatigue, scheduling, task-loading and situational awareness can all shape performance even when staffing meets what officials describe as a standard overnight arrangement.
For now, the investigation centers on a narrow window of time at LaGuardia and on the people working inside the tower as the Air Canada Express CRJ approached Runway 4. Within 30 days, the NTSB is expected to issue a preliminary report that may begin to explain how a routine runway crossing turned into a deadly collision.
