ICE, Warrantless Arrests, Colorado: New Lawsuit Alleges Court Order Violations

In Ramirez Ovando, et al. v. Noem, et al., Colorado-based advocates say ICE flouted a 2025 injunction by conducting warrantless arrests in January 2026, prompting calls for court enforcement and scrutiny of agency procedures. The dispute is playing out in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, where the ACLU of Colorado and individual plaintiffs argue that day-to-day enforcement choices are colliding with Fourth Amendment limits and a judge’s specific conditions for arrests without a warrant.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reject that framing. They describe their operations as focused on public safety and compliant with court orders. That clash—between an injunction’s legal thresholds and agents’ on-the-ground decisions—now sits at the center of a high-stakes test of how immigration enforcement may operate in Colorado when warrants are not in hand.

Section 1: Overview of the case and parties involved

Filed as Ramirez Ovando, et al. v. Noem, et al., the case challenges how ICE carries out arrests in Colorado when agents do not have a judicial warrant. A “judicial warrant” is signed by a judge. It is the common warrant most people think of in criminal cases.

Plaintiffs are backed by the ACLU of Colorado. They contend that ICE’s recent actions conflict with a court-ordered preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is a temporary order issued early in a case. It is meant to prevent harm while the lawsuit proceeds.

ICE and DHS are the federal agencies at issue. U.S. District Judge R. Brooke Jackson is the judge who issued the controlling injunction on November 25, 2025. The immediate question now is not the final merits of the lawsuit. The question is whether ICE complied with the court’s rules while conducting arrests in January 2026.

Table 1: Key dates and actions tied to the injunction and amended complaint

Section 2: The Court Order and Alleged Violations

Judge Jackson’s November 25, 2025 preliminary injunction limits “warrantless arrests” in Colorado. a warrantless arrest is an arrest made without a judicial warrant. Under the injunction, ICE may not make such arrests unless agents have probable cause that a person is in the United States unlawfully and a flight risk condition is satisfied.

Probable cause is a facts-based reason to believe a legal violation occurred. It is more than a hunch. “Flight risk,” as used in the injunction, focuses on whether the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained. That second prong matters. It forces a time-sensitive analysis, not just a status-based conclusion.

On February 4, 2026, the ACLU of Colorado filed an amended complaint that describes January 2026 operations near Vail and in Denver. The filing alleges ICE carried out warrantless raids without the flight-risk analysis required by the injunction. It also alleges “collateral arrests,” meaning agents detained people who were not the target. Plaintiffs describe those bystanders as swept up because of proximity, appearance, or circumstance.

Bond reimbursement is another flashpoint. The amended complaint alleges the government has not reimbursed bond money to plaintiffs as previously ordered. While bond disputes can sound administrative, they can become compliance evidence. Courts sometimes treat noncompliance with remedial terms as part of an enforcement record.

If plaintiffs seek to enforce the injunction, the typical mechanisms include motions to enforce and contempt proceedings. Contempt is a court’s tool for addressing violations of court orders. It can lead to new directives, required reporting, or other remedies. Outcomes depend on facts the judge credits.

⚠️ Note that the injunction restricts warrantless arrests unless probable cause and flight risk criteria are satisfied; enforcement actions may be subject to contempt proceedings

Section 3: Internal Memo Controversy and Authorization Practices

A separate controversy feeds the compliance debate. Plaintiffs point to an internal May 12, 2025 memo signed by Acting ICE Director Todd Lyons. The memo is described as authorizing or encouraging reliance on “administrative warrants” for entry into residences.

Administrative warrants differ from judicial warrants in a basic way. They are generally signed within the executive branch, such as by ICE supervisors, rather than by a judge. In many legal disputes, that distinction matters most when agents enter a home. Homes receive the highest Fourth Amendment protection. Courts often scrutinize whether entry was voluntary, supported by a judicial warrant, or justified by a narrow exception.

That does not mean every ICE encounter requires a judicial warrant. Public spaces and consent scenarios can change the analysis. Still, the memo’s alleged message—use administrative paperwork as if it were a judge’s warrant—sits near the heart of plaintiffs’ theory. They argue that it blurs lines the injunction was meant to reinforce.

Colorado’s dispute also echoes a broader national argument: whether immigration enforcement is using civil-process tools in ways that function like criminal warrants. Courts may treat that as a Fourth Amendment problem, depending on the setting and facts.

For readers who want the constitutional baseline, the Fourth Amendment text and major doctrine summaries are available through the Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School: Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School

Section 4: Arrest Statistics and Context in Colorado

Numbers are not the lawsuit, but they often shape how courts view patterns. The amended complaint’s backdrop includes a sharp rise in arrests. ICE arrested at least 3,522 people in Colorado between Jan. 20 and Oct. 15, 2025. That compares with 843 in the same period in 2024.

The composition of arrests also appears in the dispute. Data cited in the case materials says 63% of those arrested in 2025 had no prior criminal convictions. A 2024 comparison is also used in the public debate, including references to 61% with convictions in 2024. Each side can deploy these figures differently.

Plaintiffs can argue a higher-volume environment increases collateral arrests and shortcuts. DHS and ICE can argue higher numbers reflect prioritization and operational intensity, not illegality. Courts sometimes look at trends when evaluating whether violations are isolated or recurring. Statistics can also drive compliance monitoring, such as reporting requirements.

Similar legal questions have surfaced outside Colorado, including cases referenced in Oregon and the District of Columbia. That matters because federal courts often watch each other’s reasoning, even across jurisdictions. Still, Colorado’s injunction is its own order. Its wording controls what ICE must do in this state.

Section 5: Impact on affected individuals and communities

Caroline Dias Goncalves and Refugio Ramirez Ovando anchor the human side of the case. Their accounts are used to show harm that a preliminary injunction is designed to prevent.

Caroline Dias Goncalves is described as a Dreamer and a 19-year-old nursing student. The amended complaint links her arrest to a traffic stop. It alleges she was held for 15 days despite no criminal record. For injunction purposes, the details can matter. Judges often consider whether enforcement decisions create family disruption, fear, or barriers to work and school that cannot be easily repaired later.

Refugio Ramirez Ovando is described as a father of four. His arrest is alleged to have involved mistaken identity. The amended complaint says he was detained for three months. Mistaken-identity arrests can carry special weight in injunction litigation. They can be cited to show system errors, weak verification steps, or pressure created by rapid operations.

Reports from communities are also part of the record described by advocates. They claim fear and panic in Latine and immigrant communities, including accounts of “militarized” tactics. Plaintiffs connect those reports to collateral arrests. The legal claim is not about rhetoric. It is about whether the injunction’s guardrails were followed when agents chose whom to detain.

Section 6: Official statements and government sources

Tricia McLaughlin, an Assistant Secretary at DHS, has repeatedly framed ICE activity as public-safety oriented and lawful. In an Oct 2025 – Feb 2026 window, she said DHS “complies with all lawful court orders and is addressing this matter with the court.” She has also warned the public that obstructing law enforcement is a felony, in comments tied to resistance during arrests. In a Feb 2, 2026 statement, she described ICE as empowered to arrest and remove public safety threats and pledged aggressive enforcement against those who enter illegally and break laws.

Those statements set up a direct legal contrast. Plaintiffs say January 2026 actions did not satisfy the injunction’s probable-cause and flight-risk requirements. DHS says it is compliant and is litigating the dispute in court.

Verification is straightforward but document-heavy. Readers can check: – the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado docket for Ramirez Ovando, et al. v. Noem, et al.; – DHS Newsroom announcements and transcripts; – ICE news releases; – and filings from the ACLU of Colorado.

✅ Readers should verify court filings and agency statements via the DHS Newsroom, ICE releases, and the U.S. District Court docket for Colorado

Readers should consult official court documents for precise claims and outcomes.