(OREGON) — A new bid for emergency court relief is putting ICE’s authority for warrantless civil immigration arrests under a bright spotlight in federal court, as plaintiffs in Martinez Juarez, et al. v. Mayorkas, et al. ask a judge to temporarily halt certain arrest practices statewide while the case proceeds.
On January 9, 2026, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The motion (identified in the record as a specific docket entry) seeks an order restricting warrantless, civil immigration arrests in Oregon unless ICE first makes particular, individualized determinations required by statute.
the lawsuit is pending as a putative class case, meaning the named plaintiffs seek relief not only for themselves, but also for similarly situated people in Oregon.
1) Case overview and procedural posture
The case is Martinez Juarez, et al. v. Mayorkas, et al., pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs have asked the court for a preliminary injunction, which is a temporary order designed to prevent alleged harm while the litigation continues.
In immigration-enforcement litigation, a preliminary injunction is “emergency-style” relief. It usually turns on whether plaintiffs can show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) likely irreparable harm without an order, (3) that equities favor relief, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.
The exact articulation can vary by circuit, but those factors are the familiar framework in federal court. Here, the challenged conduct is described as warrantless civil immigration arrests by ICE in Oregon, allegedly performed without the statutory preconditions for bypassing a warrant.
Procedural posture matters because the court is being asked to act quickly, before a final merits decision. That is why the motion’s factual record—declarations, testimony, and any agency admissions—can be decisive.
2) Legal theory and statutory basis
the legal fight centers on the scope of ICE’s statutory power to arrest without a warrant in civil (non-criminal) immigration enforcement.
The statute: 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), immigration officers may make certain arrests without a warrant if two core conditions are satisfied:
- The officer has reason to believe the person is in the United States in violation of immigration law; and
- The person is “likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”
In plain English, the statute permits warrantless civil arrests only in a narrower set of cases than many people assume. The “likely to escape” requirement is the key limiter and is often framed as a flight-risk predicate that must exist before the arrest.
Plaintiffs’ reading and what they want ordered
The plaintiffs’ motion frames warrantless arrests as lawful only when the “likely to escape” condition is objectively discernible and supported by an individualized analysis, made before the arrest. They argue that probable cause alone is not enough if the officer cannot also justify why a warrant could not be obtained in time.
Operationally, the requested injunction would aim to change what happens pre-arrest. The motion seeks to require ICE to make and document individualized probable-cause and flight-risk determinations before relying on § 1357(a)(2).
The timeline of key filings and hearings—summarized in court materials—matters because it frames what evidence is already in the record and what the court may rely on when ruling.
Warning (Defense Practice Point): If a client was arrested without a warrant, counsel should promptly request records showing the pre-arrest basis for invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), not just post-arrest paperwork.
3) Policy challenged and description of practice
The motion describes what plaintiffs call an “Arrest First, Justify Later” pattern. They allege ICE agents in Oregon arrest people without a warrant and without making a pre-arrest, individualized determination that the person is “likely to escape” before a warrant could be obtained.
A second alleged feature is the creation of paperwork after the person is already in custody. The filings describe post-hoc generation of “warrants” or warrant-like documents after arrest.
Plaintiffs argue the timing is legally significant because § 1357(a)(2) is a pre-arrest authority that depends on what the officer determined before taking someone into custody. The motion also highlights a reported DHS concession that certain administrative “warrants” are not issued for the purpose of arrest or custody.
Plaintiffs use that point to argue that post-arrest documents cannot retroactively supply the statutory prerequisites for a warrantless arrest. The comparison evidence in the record draws a sharp contrast between what the statute and plaintiffs say is required and what plaintiffs say is occurring in practice.
The practical implication for defense strategy is that timing, documentation, and contemporaneous decision-making become the central evidentiary battleground.
4) Evidence and prior cases cited
A preliminary injunction motion rises or falls on evidence. Plaintiffs typically rely on declarations from impacted individuals, lawyers, and community witnesses. They may also rely on testimony elicited at evidentiary hearings and on government documents produced in discovery.
The motion relies in part on a prior District of Oregon decision, B.D.A.A. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3484912 (D. Or. 2025). According to the plaintiffs’ characterization, that court found a warrantless ICE arrest improper where agents lacked required probable-cause findings tied to the statutory framework.
Prior findings are not automatically binding in a new case, but they can influence a court’s view of likelihood of success—especially when the same agency practice is alleged and the record suggests repetition rather than an isolated event.
One example described in the filings is the warrantless arrest of Victor Cruz Gamez in Oregon by masked agents during a drive home from work. In a preliminary-injunction posture, a court is not deciding guilt or innocence; it asks whether the evidence suggests a systematic practice that conflicts with § 1357(a)(2)’s limits.
For defense counsel, the key factual questions usually include what facts the agent knew before the arrest, whether there was a contemporaneous “likely to escape” analysis, and whether any effort was made to seek a warrant first.
- What documentation exists, and when was it created?
- Does the paperwork track statutory elements, or does it read as a template?
- Is there a pattern of repeated similar arrests or missing documentation?
Because the record often includes competing declarations, credibility can matter. Courts also look for patterns: repeated similar arrests, repeated missing documentation, or repeated admissions that determinations were not made until after custody.
Deadline Watch: Evidence supporting suppression-type arguments in immigration court can be time-sensitive. Issue FOIA requests early and preserve bodycam, dispatch, and booking records where possible.
5) Parties, representation, and standing
The motion is brought by named plaintiffs “on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals” in Oregon. That is typical putative class framing. At the preliminary-injunction stage, however, the court can grant or deny relief without formally certifying a class.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must show standing. Standing generally requires an injury in fact, traceability, and redressability.
In enforcement-practice cases, standing disputes often focus on whether future harm is sufficiently likely, especially for people not currently in custody. Organizational plaintiffs, if any, must show a recognized standing theory.
The filings also note involvement by legal organizations, including Innovation Law Lab as a host of publicly available case materials. That support can affect litigation capacity, but it does not change the legal standing requirements.
Warning: Putative class language does not automatically protect everyone in Oregon. Individuals should not assume they are covered absent a clear court order and defined scope.
6) Government position and evidentiary context
The government’s full response is not summarized in the materials provided here. The motion, however, describes DHS/ICE as emphasizing detention and deportation “numbers” and suggests that performance pressure contributes to shortcuts around statutory limits.
Whether the court accepts that characterization will depend on the evidentiary record. The motion also references a December 2025 evidentiary hearing where ICE officials allegedly addressed post-hoc paperwork and the lack of pre-arrest flight-risk determinations.
In preliminary-injunction litigation, evidentiary hearings can be pivotal. They may generate credibility findings and factual determinations that shape the judge’s view of whether the practice is isolated or systemic.
At this stage, readers should separate three things: (1) plaintiffs’ allegations, (2) government concessions or admissions shown by testimony or documents, and (3) what the court has actually found.
A preliminary-injunction order can include factual findings, but it is still not the final merits decision.
7) Current status and next steps
As of Sunday, January 11, 2026, the motion is pending in federal court, and the provided materials do not indicate that the judge has ruled on the requested preliminary injunction.
What to watch next
Procedurally, the next steps commonly include additional briefing, possible supplemental declarations, and sometimes another hearing. The court may grant or deny the preliminary injunction, or grant narrower relief than requested.
Either side may seek appellate review, typically on an expedited basis, though timing varies. A preliminary injunction—if granted—would not automatically decide removability or confer lawful status.
It would restrict certain enforcement practices while the case proceeds. It also would likely be geographically tied to Oregon and shaped by the specific conduct challenged.
Practical steps for affected individuals and counsel
- Monitor official information through EOIR and USCIS resources, and follow court filings through the federal docket system if you have access.
- Preserve evidence of the arrest encounter, including timestamps, locations, and witness contact information.
- Seek counsel immediately if a person is in custody or has an upcoming Master Calendar Hearing.
Defense Tip: If an arrest appears to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), counsel may consider motions to suppress or terminate in immigration court in appropriate cases. Outcomes vary widely by jurisdiction and facts.
Realistic expectations for outcomes
Preliminary injunctions are difficult to obtain. Plaintiffs must show both likely success and irreparable harm. Even if the court finds problems with documentation or timing, the remedy may be narrower than a complete halt to warrantless arrests.
Separately, strong suppression or termination arguments in immigration court are fact-intensive and depend on circuit law. Representation is critical because the record must be built carefully and early.
Legal resources (official and referral)
– EOIR (Immigration Court): https://www.justice.gov/eoir
– USCIS: https://www.uscis.gov
– AILA Lawyer Referral: https://www.aila.org/find-a-lawyer
Plaintiffs in Oregon have requested a preliminary injunction against ICE to halt warrantless civil immigration arrests. They argue that ICE routinely violates federal law by failing to determine if a suspect is likely to flee before making an arrest. Alleging a pattern of post-arrest documentation, the lawsuit seeks to enforce strict pre-arrest statutory requirements and individualized determinations for all civil immigration enforcement actions within the state.
