EU Tightens Visa Rules for Russians to Single-Entry Only

(EUROPEAN UNION) The European Union will move this week to eliminate multi-entry Schengen visas for most Russian citizens, tightening visa rules as part of its 19th sanctions package against Russia and forcing applicants to accept single-entry permits except in narrow humanitarian cases or for dual nationals holding EU citizenship. The measure, expected to be formally adopted and come into force in the first week of November 2025, adds a new layer to travel restrictions for Russians across the bloc and signals a further hardening of the EU’s posture since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Under the plan, Russian applicants will generally receive single-entry visas only, meaning they can enter the Schengen Area once for a set period rather than make repeated trips over several months or years. The Commission and member states have framed the shift as a security step allied to travel control, complementing a decision to require Russian diplomats to notify EU states before moving within the border-free zone. Officials say the notification rule is intended to counter what Brussels describes as “increasingly hostile intelligence activities,” a concern that has grown as the war has dragged on and diplomatic ties have frayed.

The curb on multi-entry permits represents a substantial change in how the EU, which typically issues millions of visas each year, manages routine mobility from Russia. In 2019, before the pandemic and the war, about 4 million Schengen visas were issued to Russian citizens. That volume collapsed after 2022, when the EU suspended its visa facilitation agreement with Russia, making applications more time-consuming and more expensive, and it has only partly recovered. In 2024, EU states issued over 500,000 Schengen visas to Russians, a figure above 2023 levels but still a fraction of pre-war numbers.

“This is another step in the EU’s effort to restrict the movement of Russian nationals and limit Moscow’s influence in Europe,” an unnamed European official told POLITICO.

Their comment reflects a broader strategic shift within the bloc, where policymakers increasingly see visa policy as a tool of pressure and security management rather than a purely administrative service. The Commission is preparing a new visa strategy, due next month, that will urge member states to “leverage visa policy against hostile states” and apply stricter criteria to nationals from Russia and other countries deemed security risks.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov condemned the pending change and linked it to deeper tensions.

“Unfortunately, the Europeans are diligently recalling everything related to the confrontation that took place during the Cold War, and they are just as diligently adding new sophisticated elements to this confrontation,” he said.

Moscow has repeatedly criticized EU travel curbs since 2022, arguing they punish ordinary Russians and politicize cross-border movement.

While the new EU-wide rule sets a default of single-entry permits, the bloc will retain limited exceptions for humanitarian situations, such as urgent medical treatment or family emergencies, and for dual nationals who also hold an EU passport. In practice, eligibility will hinge on evidence presented by applicants and the discretion of consular officials, with the humanitarian bar set high in most member states. The Commission has said the approach is intended to balance security concerns with minimal flexibility for emergencies.

The effect will vary by country because national practices already diverge. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have long since closed the door to most Russian visitors, citing security and moral grounds, and they issue visas sparingly if at all. Others, including Hungary, France, Spain and Italy, continue to issue visas at relatively higher rates, reflecting a mix of tourism flows, business links and consular capacity. Converting most approvals to single-entry permits will crimp frequent travel by Russians who previously used multi-entry visas to shuttle between cities for work, studies, or family reasons. Business travelers and cultural delegations who depended on routine multi-trip movement will face extra applications, higher costs and more planning. In the academic space, students and researchers will also need to adapt, though humanitarian or special-purpose exceptions could apply in a limited set of cases.

The new obligation for Russian diplomats to notify EU countries before traveling within the Schengen Area adds a separate line of control. Though diplomats already benefit from exemptions under international law, the EU move aims to tighten visibility over official Russian movements amid allegations of espionage and influence operations. Framed as a preventive measure, the rule draws a link between mobility and counter-intelligence, relying on advance notice to help national authorities track movements that previously flowed with fewer checks.

Revenue from visa fees shows another dimension of change. EU governments earned €105 million from Russian visa applications in 2022 and €130 million in 2023, even as overall volumes fell sharply from pre-war levels. The shift to single-entry visas could keep fee income elevated because repeat travelers will need to apply again for each journey. But for applicants, especially those outside major cities, the cost will include time, travel to consulates or visa centers, and uncertainty about outcomes that have become harder to predict since 2022.

The pending decision builds on steps the EU took after the invasion. The 2022 suspension of the visa facilitation agreement ended quicker processing and reduced fees for Russians and restored full documentation demands. Consular screenings lengthened, and refusal rates rose in some countries. The new package codifies that trajectory by making multi-entry clearances the rare exception rather than a standard option, a move designed to put more control in the hands of individual consulates while visibly shrinking the scope of Russian mobility into the bloc.

National measures have moved in tandem. Belgium has not been accepting, with limited exceptions, short-term Schengen visa applications filed in Russia since March 2025. Latvia adopted a similar position as of March 2025, declining both short-term and long-term Schengen applications from Russian nationals apart from narrow exceptions. Spain added a separate constraint: starting July 12, 2025, Russian nationals have needed a transit visa to enter any international travel area in Spanish airports, with some exceptions. Those exceptions include holding a valid Schengen visa, EU/EEA residence, or diplomatic status, preserving limited channels for travelers already vetted by an EU country or covered by international law.

Regional politics have also pushed toward more stringent controls. In June 2025, proposals emerged from the Baltic States, Northern Europe and Poland to bar entry to Russians who fought against Ukraine, reflecting a hard line supported by countries with close proximity to the conflict and a history of security concerns with their eastern neighbor. While those ideas go beyond the single-entry policy, they frame the broader debate in which the Commission’s forthcoming visa strategy sits: how far to wield travel restrictions as a lever in a prolonged confrontation with Russia, and how to calibrate rules among 27 member states with differing risk assessments and economic ties.

For travelers, the practical change will be immediate once the measure takes effect this week. Russians accustomed to multi-entry visas that allowed multiple visits during six months, a year or longer will confront single-use validity stamped into their passports. Trips will need fresh applications each time, with supporting documents and appointments that have become harder to secure, especially in countries where consular services are pared back or outsourced. The single-entry approach also diminishes flexibility for people who once combined business and family visits across several Schengen countries on one multi-entry visa, complicating itineraries that rely on open internal borders.

The numbers underscore the scale of the shift. Over 500,000 Schengen visas in 2024 represent a modest revival from the immediate post-invasion slump but remain far below the 4 million issued in 2019. In countries like France, Spain and Italy, where tourism and business links remain relatively active, consulates will likely see more frequent repeat applications from the same applicants, each with fresh background checks and paperwork. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, near-total bans mean the new EU baseline may change little in practice, but it aligns the broader Schengen framework with the stricter stance already in force on the bloc’s northeastern flank.

Beyond the immediate steps, Brussels is preparing to embed these choices into policy. The planned visa strategy would formalize advice to “leverage visa policy against hostile states,” positioning visas as both a filter and a signal. That approach mirrors other elements of the EU’s response to Russia’s war, where sanctions packages increasingly stitch together financial, trade, and mobility controls. The current package is the 19th, reflecting a steady rhythm of measures since 2022 rather than a single one-off response.

Critics in Moscow have framed the tightening as indiscriminate punishment of civilians, a line amplified by Peskov’s reference to Cold War-era confrontation. EU officials counter that national security and public order justify stricter screening, and that humanitarian exceptions exist precisely to avoid undue harm in emergencies. Between those poles lies the administrative reality: consular staff will decide, case by case, which applicants fit the narrow exceptions and which must reapply for each trip, with uneven experiences across the 27 capitals.

The diplomatic notification rule illustrates how the EU is trying to close perceived gaps. By asking Russian diplomats to alert member states before traveling within the Schengen Area, authorities expect to gain awareness of movements that could otherwise slip under the radar in a border-free zone. The requirement will not stop travel by accredited diplomats, but it will create records and timelines for national services charged with monitoring “increasingly hostile intelligence activities.” For the EU, that visibility is part of a larger posture that treats mobility data as a security asset.

Spain’s new airport transit visa illustrates how national decisions can layer on top of EU frameworks. By obliging Russian nationals to obtain a transit visa to enter any international travel area in Spanish airports as of July 12, 2025, Madrid effectively adds a checkpoint for connecting passengers who previously passed through without special clearance. The exceptions—valid Schengen visa, EU/EEA residence, diplomats—mean those already vetted or protected by international law can still connect, but the default is tighter control.

For a sense of what the rules mean in practice, consider the traveler who once used a multi-entry visa to visit family in Italy, attend a conference in Germany, and make a business stop in France over several months. Under the new EU-wide approach, that person would need to secure a single-entry visa for each individual journey, with new paperwork and timing each time. If they route through Spain after mid-July, they may also need a transit visa unless covered by one of the exceptions. Multiply that across hundreds of thousands of trips and the system shifts from a model of ongoing access to one of discrete, closely controlled entries.

The EU’s decision arrives as governments tally both security costs and administrative burdens. More single-entry applications will likely strain consulates in countries issuing higher volumes, even as total approvals remain far below pre-war peaks. Meanwhile, the revenue figures—€105 million in 2022 and €130 million in 2023 from Russian visa applications—suggest that fee income will continue to flow, albeit on a smaller pool of travelers. That tension—between security pressure and service capacity—is built into the policy.

The Commission notes that the Schengen system already includes common rules and national discretion, and the new package leans on both. The default will be single-entry visas for Russians, alongside an obligation for diplomats to provide travel notice. Humanitarian exceptions remain possible. Member states will implement within a common framework, but the landscape will still reflect national choices, from the Baltic bans to Spain’s transit rule. For official information on Schengen short-stay visas, applicants can consult the European Commission’s short-stay visas page.

For now, the signal is clear: the EU is narrowing the channels for routine travel from Russia, recasting visas as an instrument of pressure and surveillance in a long confrontation. As the 19th sanctions package takes effect this week, the end of multi-entry visas for most Russians will make each trip a test of timing, paperwork and policy, and it will place more discretion in the hands of consular officials weighing individual cases against a security-first baseline. The result is a more restrictive map for Russian mobility in Europe, with the edges defined by single-use permits, advance diplomatic notice, and a growing readiness in Brussels and national capitals to bind movement to geopolitics.