(EL CAJON, CALIFORNIA) The California Attorney General is suing the City of El Cajon over how its police department uses and shares license plate data, thrusting a local surveillance tool into a statewide fight over privacy, civil rights, and the reach of immigration enforcement.
On October 3, 2025, Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a lawsuit that accuses the El Cajon Police Department of letting out-of-state and federal agencies search its automated license plate reader (ALPR) system in violation of California law, and of allowing hundreds of immigration-related searches this year alone.
According to reporting based on El Cajon records, the department’s ALPR network was used for more than 550 immigration-related searches in 2025, often involving queries by or for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. The case is the first of its kind against a local police department in California for alleged misuse of ALPR systems and could set a precedent that shapes how agencies across the United States handle the technology.
How the technology works and the concerns it raises
Automated license plate reader systems combine simple images with powerful databases. Cameras mounted on poles and patrol cars:
- Scan plates automatically
- Time-stamp each sighting
- Store location data (often GPS) for later search
Each scan saves the plate number, date, time, and location, creating a detailed trail of where a car has been. In criminal cases, police cite quick wins: a stolen car recovered within minutes, a child located during an Amber Alert, or a suspect vehicle placed at a crime scene.
But most scans do not involve criminal activity, and that imbalance fuels concerns that ALPR records act like location logs for anyone who drives through a city with cameras—raising privacy risks, especially for immigrants and mixed-status families.
The lawsuit: allegations and legal framework
The lawsuit centers on Flock Safety cameras placed around El Cajon that scan plates, timestamp sightings, and store location data for later search. State law—including the 2015 statute known as SB 34—limits who can access and share that data.
The Attorney General’s complaint alleges that El Cajon:
- Allowed at least 26 out-of-state law enforcement agencies to search its database
- Enabled federal immigration-related searches that appear to fall outside the exceptions in state law
- Failed to keep access narrow and in-state as SB 34 requires
State officials argue those practices erode privacy protections California put in place after lawmakers raised concerns about mass data collection and the potential harms to drivers and immigrant communities.
State enforcement efforts and the current action
The Attorney General’s office says it has been pressing agencies to follow state rules since 2024, sending compliance letters to 18 departments across California. The El Cajon case signals that warnings have not been enough.
The state is asking a judge to:
- Order the city to stop unauthorized sharing
- Require the city to adopt tighter rules
- Purge data shared in violation of the law
The litigation is pending. Its outcome could reset how license plate data is used from San Diego County to the Oregon border.
Reporting and documented searches
- A KPBS analysis of El Cajon Police Department records found more than 550 immigration-related searches in early 2025, tied to federal immigration agencies.
- CalMatters reported in June 2025 that roughly a dozen Southern California agencies, including San Diego County, shared license plate data with federal immigration authorities despite state restrictions.
These findings helped set the stage for the Attorney General’s lawsuit and a broader debate over access, retention, and misuse of ALPR data.
Policy background: SB 34 and the vetoed SB 274
SB 34 requires agencies to:
- Publish clear ALPR policies
- Train users
- Safeguard data
- Limit sharing
Governor Gavin Newsom recently vetoed Senate Bill 274, which would have mandated stricter rules: set data purges, audits, and documentation of every access request. With SB 274 vetoed, enforcement will rely on existing law and litigation like the El Cajon case.
Law enforcement perspectives and department responses
Police defenders of ALPRs point to lifesaving and investigative benefits:
- Missing seniors found after plate hits
- Robbery crews stopped
- Carjacked vehicles recovered quickly
Some departments, like the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office, argue that longer retention periods are necessary for complex, time-consuming investigations.
Other agencies have changed policies after scrutiny—Coronado Police Department updated policies as an example—showing that adjustments can be made without abandoning the technology.
Risks, misuse, and community impact
Audits and investigations in multiple states show:
- The vast majority of license plate data has no link to criminal probes
- Some officers have misused ALPR tools for personal reasons
Civil liberties groups argue these risks fall hardest on immigrant communities:
- Plate queries tied to a vehicle can lead to immigration-related searches without the person’s knowledge
- Families with mixed status may avoid clinics, schools, workplaces, or places of worship because of camera locations
Advocacy groups calling for stronger protections include:
- TRUST SD Coalition
- American Friends Service Committee
- ACLU
- Electronic Frontier Foundation
They ask for stronger civilian oversight, tighter access rules, and bans on sharing that would let plate data enter federal immigration systems.
Technical controls, vendors, and contracts
Technology vendors (e.g., Flock Safety) influence how systems operate:
- Vendors set default retention periods and access controls
- Platforms can disable out-of-state sharing for California clients and create audit tools
- Poor configuration can enable over-collection and easy sharing
City contracts and service-level agreements should:
- Spell out state compliance and access limits
- Include audit rights
- Be posted publicly so residents see what was purchased and the expected controls
What enforcement or a court order could require
If the court finds violations, potential remedies include:
- Ordering halt of unauthorized sharing
- Requiring purge of unlawfully shared data
- Demanding detailed audits
- Imposing ongoing oversight by the state or a court-appointed monitor
Such orders would likely prompt agencies statewide to run compliance checks and tighten controls.
Practical steps recommended by experts
Residents and experts suggest several practical reforms to preserve utility while limiting surveillance:
- Set a short standard retention period and keep data longer only when tied to a documented case.
- Block out-of-state and federal access by default; allow exceptions only with written approvals and logged justifications.
- Publish monthly reports with total queries and counts of any immigration-related searches, and list outside agencies granted access.
- Run random audits and report misuse publicly, including disciplinary actions taken.
- Mark camera locations on a public map so people know where scanning happens.
These measures can show the public that ALPRs are used for legal, specific purposes rather than broad surveillance.
What residents and community groups can do now
There is no way to stop a plate from being scanned in public, and no formal opt-out under current rules. Residents can:
- Ask the city council to hold hearings on the ALPR program
- Demand clear public reports with counts of immigration-related searches
- Request the city adopt rules that cut off out-of-state and federal access except as state law permits
- File public records requests for audit logs and copies of the department’s ALPR policy
- Push for independent audits and support civil rights groups pursuing enforcement
Employers, schools, and faith groups can ask for notices, post camera locations, and host forums so members make informed choices.
Wider pattern and why the case matters statewide
The Attorney General said it sent compliance letters to 18 agencies since 2024; advocates documented 71 agencies in violation in 2023; and reporters found multiple Southern California departments sharing ALPR data with federal immigration authorities.
The El Cajon lawsuit is the first time the state has gone to court against a local department for ALPR misuse. A ruling against El Cajon could ripple across California, forcing agencies to:
- Cut off out-of-state access
- Build tighter technical and policy fences around ALPR data
If agencies act now—locking down out-of-state access, publishing detailed reports, and limiting retention—they may avoid legal trouble. Those that wait risk facing enforcement actions similar to El Cajon’s.
How to learn more
For official guidance, the California Department of Justice posts public resources on ALPR laws, privacy, and use policies here: California Department of Justice ALPR guidance.
Key facts on the record
- 550+ immigration-related searches in 2025 tied to El Cajon’s system (reported by KPBS)
- Alleged searches by agencies in at least 26 other states
- First-of-its-kind lawsuit filed by the state Attorney General
These facts underline the stakes: they affect families driving to work, children going to school, and people seeking health care or worship—anywhere a plate scan records a stop.
What to expect next
The legal process will take months—filings, hearings, possible settlement talks—and may not resolve every policy question. But it will:
- Test whether sharing license plate data with out-of-state agencies is allowed under SB 34 as alleged
- Decide whether immigration-related searches in El Cajon complied with state rules
- Determine whether the city must change how it runs its ALPR network
Whatever the final ruling, public debate has shifted: communities now demand proof that ALPR systems protect both safety and privacy, honor state law, and do not quietly feed immigration-related scrutiny.
The El Cajon lawsuit has made those details impossible to ignore.
This Article in a Nutshell
On October 3, 2025, California AG Rob Bonta filed a lawsuit against El Cajon alleging its police department improperly allowed out-of-state and federal access to automated license plate reader (ALPR) data, violating SB 34. KPBS analysis found more than 550 immigration-related searches tied to the city’s Flock Safety ALPR system in early 2025, and the complaint says agencies from at least 26 states accessed the database. The state seeks court orders to stop unauthorized sharing, tighten access rules, and purge unlawfully shared records. The case is the first against a local California police department for ALPR misuse and could shape statewide practices on retention, vendor contracts, audits, and public reporting to protect privacy and immigrant communities.
