Russia Issues 36,413 Visas to North Korean Citizens in 2025, Nearly All for Education

(RUSSIA) — Russia issued 36,413 visas to North Korean citizens in 2025, with 35,849 of them designated for educational purposes, a sharp rise from the 9,239 visas issued in 2024.

The figures, drawn from Russia’s Foreign Ministry consular department, show that almost all of the 2025 visas went to North Korean citizens traveling for educational purposes. That category alone rose from 8,616 in 2024 to 35,849 in 2025.

The total means Russia granted nearly four times as many visas to North Korean citizens in 2025 as it did a year earlier. Educational visas accounted for more than 98% of all visas issued to North Korean citizens during the year.

Other categories remained far smaller. Russia issued 266 humanitarian visas, 72 tourist visas, 47 business visas, 6 private visas and 33 official or service visas.

Several of those categories also rose from low 2024 levels. Tourist visas increased from 6 in 2024 to 72 in 2025, while business visas climbed from 3 in 2024 to 47.

Humanitarian visas stood at 266, compared with 307 in 2024. Official or service visas fell to 33, from 68 in 2024.

The figures point to one overwhelming trend: Russia’s 2025 visa issuance to North Korean citizens was dominated by people traveling on documents classified for educational purposes. No other category came close.

That concentration has drawn attention because it follows a broader increase in cross-border movement between Russia and North Korea in the previous year. In 2024, North Korean entries into Russia reached 13,221, a 12-fold increase from prior year, including 7,887 students.

That student total was the highest since 2019, according to Moscow’s Federal Security Service, or FSB. The latest visa issuance data suggest that the upward trajectory continued in 2025, and that educational channels remained at the center of it.

Visa issuance and actual arrivals are not the same. The consular figures record visas granted, while actual entries can differ, and some accounts have noted discrepancies between visas issued and the number of people who ultimately cross the border.

Still, the scale of the increase has fed questions that were already circulating in 2024 and 2025. Analysts and South Korean intelligence have said they suspect that many visas issued to North Korean citizens as students may conceal labor migration and could help bypass U.N. sanctions.

Those concerns have focused on whether some North Korean citizens entering Russia under student designations are in fact working. Accounts published during 2025 described thousands of North Korean workers on construction sites and in factories.

By May 2025, ~15,000 North Korean laborers were reportedly in Russia, many in the Far East. South Korea’s Ministry of Unification has alleged that thousands of DPRK construction workers were dispatched in violation of sanctions.

The 2025 visa numbers do not themselves establish what visa holders did after arrival. They do, however, show the scale of the educational category with unusual clarity: 35,849 of 36,413 visas.

That leaves a combined 564 visas across every other category. In raw terms, the educational stream outweighed humanitarian, tourist, business, private and official/service visas together by a wide margin.

The shift also stands out when compared with 2024. Russia issued 8,616 educational visas to North Korean citizens that year, meaning the category jumped by more than 27,000 in a single year.

Tourist visas, though still limited in number, also expanded sharply in percentage terms, rising from 6 to 72. Business visas followed a similar pattern, increasing from 3 to 47, while private visas remained marginal at 6.

Humanitarian and official or service visas moved the other way. Humanitarian visas slipped from 307 to 266, and official or service visas fell from 68 to 33.

The overall picture is one of a visa relationship increasingly concentrated in one label. For North Korean citizens receiving Russian visas in 2025, educational purposes overwhelmingly defined the official basis for travel.

That matters because the educational channel has become central to debates over labor mobility involving North Korean citizens. Sanctions have long sought to restrict overseas labor deployments, and scrutiny has intensified when large numbers appear under categories that do not obviously match later employment patterns.

The 2024 entry figures added to that scrutiny. Of the 13,221 North Korean entries recorded that year, 7,887 were counted as students, setting the highest mark since 2019 and reinforcing questions over whether education was the sole reason for travel in every case.

Russia’s 2025 visa issuance data now extend that pattern into a new year and on a larger scale. The count of 36,413 visas suggests a much broader channel of approved travel than the year before, even if the number of actual arrivals may end up lower.

For officials and analysts tracking sanctions enforcement, that gap between visas granted and people who enter remains important. A visa authorizes travel, but it does not by itself show whether the holder arrived, where the person stayed, or what work, if any, followed.

For that reason, the 2025 figures are likely to be read alongside border entry data and accounts from worksites in Russia’s Far East and other regions. The educational designation, not the smaller humanitarian or tourist streams, is where attention is likely to remain.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry consular department data provide the clearest snapshot yet of how the country formally classified travel by North Korean citizens in 2025. On that measure, one category dominated almost entirely.

Out of 36,413 visas issued to North Korean citizens, 35,849 were for educational purposes. The rest, spread across humanitarian, tourist, business, private and official/service travel, formed only a narrow share of the total.